Opinion Submitted to the Council concerning the applications for membership from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. Supplement to Bulletin No. 9/10-1969, 1 October 1969 by unknown
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
OPINION SUBMITTED TO THE COUNCIL 
concerning the applications for membership 
from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway 
(1 October 1969) 
£0.2.6 
PRICE PER ISSUE 
$0.30 FB 15.- FF 1.70 DM 1. 20 Lit. 180 
The supplement is supplied free of charge to subscribers and purchasers of the Bulletin. 
This brochure is being distributed as Supplement 
to Bulletin No. 9/10- 1969 
Fl. 1.10 
ECSC- EEC~- EAEC 
Opinion concerning the Applications for 
Membership from the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Denmark and Norway submitted 
under Articles 237 of the EEC Treaty, 
205 of the Euratom Treaty, and 98 of the 
ECSC Treaty 
COMMISSION 

CONTENTS 
Page 
INTRODUCTION 7 
TITLE I - ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY 9 
Chapter 1 - General 9 
Chapter 2 - The economic problems 12 
(a) Agriculture 12 
(b) Economic and financial problems 16 
Chapter 3 - The practical problems 22 
(a) Problems raised by simultaneity of the applications 22 
(b) Problems involved in actual entry 23 
Chapter 4 - Economic integration in Europe 24 
TITLE II - STRENGTHENING OF THE COMMUNITY 27 
Chapter 1 - The Community's future development 27 
Chapter 2 - Strengthening and enlargement 29 
TITLE III - FUNCTIONING OF THE INSTITUTIONS 31 
Chapter 1 - General 31 
Chapter 2 - Improvements to the functioning of the institutions ~n the 
Community as it is today 32 
(a) The Parliament 32 
(b) The Council 33 
(c) The Commission 34 
Chapter 3 - The institutions of an enlarged Community 35 
s. 9/10- 1969 3 
TITLE IV REMARKS ON PROCEDURE 
CONCLUSIONS 
ANNEX 
Page 
39 
43 
A. CUSTOMS UNION AND ECONOMIC UNION 47 
Chapter I The customs union 49 
(a) New dimensions 49 
(b) Abolition of obstacles to intra-Community trade 50 
(c) Application of the common customs tariff (CCT) 52 
(d) Problems connected with commercial policy 53 
Chapter II Industrial development 54 
(a) Industrial policy 55 
(i) Establishment of the single market in certain 
sectors 55 
(ii) A statute for companies 56 
(iii) Patents 57 
(iv) The structure of industry 57 
(v) Investments by non-member countries 58 
(vi) The special problems of steel 58 
(b) Research and Technology Policy 60 
(i) Recent trend 60 
(ii) New prospects in an enlarged Community 62 
(iii} Specific nuclear research problems 63 
4 s. 9/10. 1969 
Page 
(c) Energy policy 65 
(i) Summary comparison of the energy economies 66 
(ii) The energy policy's general objectives and 
framework of action 67 
(iii) Establishing the common energy market 68 
(d) Safeguards and controls 70 
Chapter III - Agricultural policy 71 
(a) Quantitative and qualitative changes in the basic 
data concerning agriculture in an enlarged Community 71 
(b) Special problems of candidate countries 73 
(1) United Kingdom 74 
(2) Ireland 76 
(3) Denmark 77 
(4) Norway 77 
(c) Financial problems 78 
Chapter IV - Other problems relating to economic union 81 
(a) Liberalization of capital movements 81 
(b) Harmonization of taxes 82 
(c) Restrictive agreements and dominant positions 82 
(d) Technical obstacles to trade: industrial standards 82 
(e) Regional policy 83 
(f) Financing of social security 84 
(g) Nordic labour market 84 
(h) Commonwealth Immigration Act 85 
(i) Transport 85 
(j) ECSC levy 85 
s. 9 I 1 o - 1969 5 
Page 
B. ENLARGED COMMUNITY AND NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES 87 
Chapter V - 89 
1. General effects of enlargement on relations with 
non-member countries 89 
2. Relations with the developing countries 90 
(a) General 90 
(b) Effects of enlargement on relations with associated 
countries 93 
(c) Relations with the Maghreb countries 95 
(d) Relations with the other developing countries 96 
3. Relations with the other non-member countries 97 
(a) Canada, Australia, New Zealand 97 
(b) The United States 98 
(c) Japan 98 
(d) USSR and countries of Eastern Europe 99 
6 S. 9 I 1 o - 1969 
INTRODUCTION 
1. At a meeting held on 22/23 July 1969 the Council invited the 
Commission to bring up to date the Opinions it had issued in 
September 1967 and April 1968 concerning the applications for 
membership from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and 
Norway. 
2. In reviewing the above-mentioned documents, the Commission 
has found that in general the points made in the Opinion of 
September 1967 had lost nothing of their value and that there 
was no need to modify the general trend of the document or the 
conclusions drawn. 1 
3. It is, however, indispensable that the document should be 
brought up to date. The progress made towards economic union 
since 1967 has changed certain of the facts of the situation and 
brought out the need to strengthen, to "deepen" or to develop the 
Community. Attention had already been drawn to this need in the 
Opinion of September 1967, and developments since that time have 
aroused an awareness of the problems facing the six founder States 
in conditions which are such that failure to recognize it would mean 
jeopardizing the survival of what had been achieved in ten years 
of joint endeavour. The prospect of a wider Community makes 
such an examination more urgent than ever. Finally, the 
institutional problems must be dealt with more fully than in the 
Opinion of September 1967. 
4. As in 1967, the present Opinion, also submitted under Articles 237 
of the EEC Treaty, 205 of the Euratom Treaty and 98 of the ECSC 
Treaty, is preliminary in character. The basic options will remain 
open as long as the positions reached through negotiations are not 
known. 
1 On the other hand the Commission felt that the discussions in the Council on 22 
and 23 July 1969 meant that the approach which underlay the Opinion of 2 April 1968 had 
ceased to be relevant and that, while the document should remain in the dossier devoted to 
enlargement of the Community, there was now no point in bringing it up to date. 
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The Commission none the less considers that this document should 
make it possible for the Council and the Member States to define 
the framework of membership negotiations rapidly and with the 
requisite precision. 
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TITLE I 
ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY 
Chapter 1 
General 
5. The United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway have 
maintained their applications for membership. The candidature of 
the United Kingdom cannot be considered in isolation from those 
of the other three countries. On the one hand, an a priori choice 
cannot be made between applications from European countries 
which have all declared that they are ready to accept unreservedly 
the Community's economic objectives and its aim of political union. 
On the other hand, these other three countries could hardly 
contemplate joining the Community independently of the United 
Kingdom because of the links uniting them with that country, 
particularly as members of EFTA, and it would also be difficult for 
them to remain outside a Community enlarged by accession of the 
United Kingdom alone. 
6. The possibility for any European State to join the Community is 
laid down in the Treaties of Paris and Rome. Furthermore, in the 
Preamble to the Treaty of Rome, the founder States declared that 
they were: 
"Determined to establish the foundations of an ever closer union 
among the European peoples" 
and 
"Resolved to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by 
establishing this combination of resources, and calling upon the other 
peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts". 
It is in this spirit, then, that the Community should examine 
applications for membership made by any European countries which 
subscribe to these principles and to these objectives. 
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This being so, the Commission considers that accession by Sweden 
should be envisaged only if the negotiations with that country were 
to show that it is in a position to accept without restriction the 
political aims of the Community as these appear from the 
Preambles to the Treaties. 
7. On the plane of principles, the accessiOn of States whose 
traditions of political equilibrium and democracy are as 
old-established and deep-seated as are those of the candidate 
countries would be of,~great value to the Community, both as 
regards its internal development and the exercise of increased 
responsibilities in international life. 
8. As regards objectives, the enlargement of the Common Market to 
include countries whose level of development is comparable to that 
of the Six would have the further effect of creating a large economic 
entity which, particularly because of a better division of labour and 
the greater economies of scale resulting from mass production, 
should permit a more rapid improvement in living standards. 
However, these advantages need to be assessed in the light of the 
Community's past experience. There are fairly narrow limits to 
the elimination of obstacles to trade if it is not accompanied and 
then underpinned by the establishment of a genuine economic 
union enabling firms to adapt their organization and activities to 
the new dimensions of the market. Unless complemented by such 
positive action, the elimination of obstacles to trade will itself 
. . 
remam precanous. 
The fact that enlargement of the Community raises additional 
problems makes it all the more important to maintain its dynamism. 
9. In any case the accession of new members to the Communities 
implies acceptance on their part not only of the Treaties but also 
of the decisions1 which have been made since the Treaties came 
into force. 
1 The word "decisions" is used here in a general sense and does not refer to the character of the 
acts taken by the Community institutions. It also covers the agreements concluded with 
non-member countries. 
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These decisions, which are the fruits of generally hard-won 
compromise between the six founder States, have become essential 
elements of the de facto solidarity which links the Six together and, 
from this angle, of the very existence of the Community. This 
is why, as a general rule, a solution to the concrete problems will 
have to be sought by working out transitional measures and not 
by amending the existing rules. 
In several fields measures have been envisaged or undertaken even 
where the wording of the Treaties did no more than formulate 
principles without providing for detailed commitments. This is the 
case, for example, as regards the aid arrangements for coalmining, 
medium-term policy, monetary policy, industrial policy, etc. 
In each case the further commitments accepted by the Member 
States resulted not just from the undertaking to establish an 
economic union among themselves, but also from the practical 
requirements brought out by experience gained in implementing 
the Treaties; it has not, however, been found necessary to make 
formal additions to the Treaties. 
10. The acceptance by new members, during the membership 
negotiations, of the objectives already fixed by the Community and, 
save for any minor adjustments which might prove necessary, of the 
acts already adopted, would not in itself suffice to ensure that the 
tasks to be accomplished in the coming years will be successfully 
completed. It remains to be seen, too, whether the commitments 
written into the Treaty or already assumed by the present members 
are sufficient to guarantee the efficacy of the enlarged Communities 
or whether, on the contrary, certain more precise undertakings on 
the part of the old and the new members will not be required. 
It therefore appears advisable to make sure, at least in certain 
essential fields, that when negotiating with the present members of 
the Community these countries should declare their agreement 
with the necessary objectives and with the appropriate methods to 
achieve them. These fields should include not only questions 
whose interest and urgency would be increased by enlargement of the 
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Communities, but also those to which the wider Community would 
attribute fundamental importance from the angle of its future 
economic and political development. 
Chapter 2 
The economic problems 
11 . The Commission devoted Titles II and III of its Opinion of 
29 September 1967 to these questions, dealing in particular with the 
economic aspects of enlargement. These it considered from the 
internal point of view and from that of the Community's external 
relations. Since some of the factors on which the Commission's 
analysis was based have since changed, the relevant passages have 
been revised. The review has again made it clear that the main 
problems, requiring priority consideration, concern essentially 
agriculture and economic policy, especially monetary problems. 
Since United Kingdom membership could be expected to lead to 
membership for the other candidates and since the problems discussed 
in this chapter are of overriding importance in connection with the 
United Kingdom application, they have been examined primarily 
from the point of view of the prospective membership of that 
country. 
(a) Agriculture 
12. In its September 1967 Opinion, the Commission stated that 
enlargement of the Community could not be allowed to call into 
question the common agricultural policy. 
An analysis of changes in the basic economic factors of agriculture 
in an enlarged Community1 shows that membership of the four 
candidate countries would not alter them. The entry of new 
members would not by itself entail a review of the bases of the 
1 An analysis of the changes in the basic factors and in the main problems posed by enlargement 
-brought up to date according to the latest available data- is given in the Annex (Chapter III). 
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common agricultural policy: a single agricultural market based 
on the common organization of that market with common prices 
for the main products, a single system of trade with non-member 
countries and priority for commodities produced in the Community. 
The maintenance of these fundamental principles does not, 
however; mean that adaptation of the methods by which this 
policy is implemented may not prove necessary. 
Nor should enlargement of the Community affect the principles 
underlying the financing of the agricultural policy, principles which 
reflect the financial solidarity of the Six: Community financial 
responsibility with regard to the price and marketing guarantees 
provided by the market policy and the provision of funds with 
which the Community can finance measures to improve the 
structure of agriculture. 
13. When restating its basic attitudes in the present Opinion, the 
Commission is not unaware of the difficult problems, some of which 
have grown more serious in recent years, that will be raised by 
extension of the Community policy to countries where at present 
the agricultural situation is unlike that in the Community and 
the concept of agricultural policy also differs. Agreement on 
some of these matters would have to be reached between old and 
new members in the negotiations. The main problems are: 
(i) The repercussions, on both production and consumption, that 
will inevitably follow application of the common agricultural policy 
in the enlarged Community; 
(ii) The financial consequences of the common agricultural policy; 
(iii) Difficulties which might arise in respect of Commonwealth 
sugar and New Zealand butter. 
It should be possible to solve the problems connected with levels of 
farmgate and consumer prices by means of appropriate transitional 
measures which would spread the necessary adjustments over a 
period of time. 
14. Since the Commission rendered its September 1967 Opinion, 
the Community has become aware-independently of the question 
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of enlargement-of the grave problems created by developments on 
the agricultural market, both where farmers and the consumers are 
concerned and from the financial point of view. In its Memorandum 
on the refo:J;"m of agriculture submitted to the Council at the end of 
1968, the Commission has suggested how the Community's 
agricultural problems could be solved. In particular, it has 
recommended measures to deal with the structure of production 
and marketing and suggested a new approach to policy on markets 
and prices. The new line envisaged for the common agricultural 
policy is intended to establish equilibrium between output and 
market potential, having due regard to possible imports and 
exports, and to ensure that there is now and in the future a 
satisfactory remuneration for the capital and labour employed 
in agriculture. 
15. If, before the opening of negotiations, the Community were to 
agree on the aims of such a new approach in agricultural policy, the 
road would be open for solving the economic and social problems 
which have beset agriculture for so long that prompt action is 
called for. The need for such action is made even more urgent by 
the prospect that the Community may be enlarged. 
Just to extend the existing common agricultural policy (especially 
the price and marketing guarantees) to the new members without 
the revision recommended could well engender a major increase in 
the output of certain key agricultural products in the candidate 
countries. On the other hand, the drive to improve the structure of 
production in agriculture and of the relevant marketing system will 
help the agricultural sector to close the gap between the situation 
in the Community and the highly efficient agriculture of certain 
candidate countries. 
16. By establishing the targets to be achieved in the process of 
revising the agricultural policy, the Community would create a 
favourable outlook which could induce the new members to accept 
more easily certain commitments that they will have to assume. 
This is particularly the case where the financing problem and the 
problem of trade with non-member countries are concerned. 
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17. Faced with a sum of 2 300 million u.a., which is the amount 
budgeted for in 1969 on present bases for the support of the market 
in the Six alone, and given that this sum is likely to increase, the new 
members may well have doubts about accepting the principles which 
underlie the financing of the common agricultural policy and would 
be tempted to challenge them. By an act of political will and a 
vigorous drive to establish a new approach to this policy, the 
necessary sums, especially for market support, can be scaled down 
to a much lower figure. These measures would entail a major 
financial effort for a limited period, but the resulting longer-term 
outlook would strengthen the Community's case for requiring the 
candidate countries to accept the common agricultural policy, 
including the principle of financial solidarity and its consequences, 
as soon as they join. 
18. With regard to the problem of the costs ansmg from the 
application of the agricultural policy, it should be noted that 
the Community agricultural system combined with the own resources 
system will result in these costs being borne by the consumer. For 
foodstuffs produced in the Community, the consumer will, generally 
speaking, pay a price that stems from the market organization 
measures. For imported foodstuffs he will pay the same price, 
which in this case will include the levy and any customs duties. 
These levies and duties will be credited to the Community budget, 
as will the customs duties on industrial goods and any indirect taxes, 
which are also paid by the consumer. Expenditure from the 
Community budget, including that for agriculture, will therefore be 
entirely defrayed by the consumer. 
This system will be necessary because of the supply situation in the 
Community and of the place occupied by the agricultural sector in 
the economy as a whole, a situation which will not be changed 
fundamentally by enlargement. 
The extension to the candidate countries of the common agricultural 
policy with a common price level and an own resources system will 
mean that the consumer in the candidate countries, as now in the 
Member States, will defray, without discrimination, the costs of the 
common policy. 
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19. By deciding to embark on effective action to make EEC 
agriculture more competitive, to get rid of structural surpluses in the 
Community while avoiding increases in agricultural production in 
the candidate countries, it should be possible to maintain in the 
enlarged Community a certain volume of imports and thus to 
reconcile the interests of agriculture and the interests of the external 
trade of this Community. With this in view, account could also be 
taken, when the common agricultural policy of the enlarged 
Community is put into practice, of the adjustments certain 
Commonwealth countries would have to make. In view of the 
preponderant position which the enlarged Community will occupy 
where international trade in agricultural produce is concerned, and 
of the worldwide responsibilities which will consequently rest on the 
Community, it would seem that the measures it takes in this 
context should be coupled with much wider action at world level. 
The Community should take the necessary initiative to ensure 
that all the major countries exporting or importing agricultural 
products act in concert with the Community. 
20. Briefly, the Commission believes that the negotiations must not 
jeopardize the essentials of the common agricultural policy; the 
problems raised for the new members by the need to adapt 
themselves to this policy must be solved through appropriate 
transitional measures. 
(b) Economic and financial problems 
21. In its Opinion of 29 September 1967, the Commission stated that 
among the candidate countries the United Kingdom required, from 
the economic and financial point of view, special study. It 
emphasized three problems "that would have to be resolved 
before that country could, where economic policy and the balance 
of payments are concerned, effectively pursue the objectives laid 
down by the Treaty of Rome". These were: 
(i) The deficit in the United Kingdom balance of payments, which 
must be eliminated on a lasting basis if the United Kingdom is to be 
able to shoulder the obligations now borne by member countries 
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and to cope with the additional burdens which, initially, will arise 
for the United Kingdom because of its membership; 
(ii) The fluctuations .in the sterling balances, which can expose 
sterling to sudden strains, constitute a factor of disequilibrium in the 
United Kingdom economy and would be a source of difficulty for the 
Community if and when Britain joins; 
(iii) The international role of sterling, in view of the difficulties 
which the role of sterling could cause with regard to the convergence 
of economic objectives between the United Kingdom and the other 
members of an enlarged Community, and also in connection with the 
future establishment of a Community monetary system. 
Since that Opinion was submitted to the Council, events have 
occurred in the British economy which affect the problems referred 
to above. The most important of these events are: 
(i) The 14.3% devaluation of sterling in November 1967 and its 
consequences for the United Kingdom balance of payments; 
(ii) The implementation of a system set up within the framework of 
the Bank for International Settlements to curb withdrawals on 
sterling balances held by public authorities of the sterling area 
countries. 
22. The Commission made certain oral comments on the devaluation 
of sterling at a Council session on 11 December 1967. 
The effects expected from the change in the parity of sterling and 
from the economic policy measures announced by the British 
Government in a letter of intent sent to the International Monetary 
Fund in November 1967, when Britain was seeking an additional 
credit of $1 400 million from the IMF to support these measures, 
have been materialized but with some delay. 
Because of the difficulties experienced by the British Government in 
reaching the targets it had set itself and the problems raised by the 
repayment of certain debts on the dates originally agreed, it decided 
in the early months of 1969 to re-examine the policy pursued after 
devaluation and to amend its balance of payments aims. 
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A further letter of intent sent to the International Monetary Fund on 
22 May 1969 set out new economic policy commitments based on 
attainment during the budget year ending on 31 March 1970 of a 
surplus of at least £300 million on the basic balance of payments. 
23. It is not impossible that this objective will be achieved in the 
period stated. Exports are developing satisfactorily, and in the 
future they will be stimulated by the vigorous reorganization of 
British industry that has been promoted over the last two years by 
the IRC (Industrial Reorganization Corporation). "Invisible 
earnings" have climbed sharply, but no firm predictions can be 
made in this connection. In the first half of 1969, the United 
Kingdom balance of payments achieved an overall surplus of 
£100 million. It is however difficult at the present time to make 
any definite statement concerning the nature and the exact scale 
of the improvements in the balance of payments. Interpretation 
of the figures raises delicate technical problems. Moreover, the 
improvement took place during a period of rapid expansion of 
world trade and at a time when certain temporary restrictions on 
imports into the United Kingdom were in force (system of 
compulsory import deposits). Finally, it should be noted that in 
the first half of 1969, the period during which the improvement 
in the figures was particularly clear, growth was weak, since in 
annual terms it is still below 1.5%. 
However, if the impression that the British economy has entered a 
phase of export-led growth were to be confirmed, the balance of 
payments objective pursued could well be achieved without growth 
lagging behind a rate consonant with the full employment of the 
country's productive resources. 
24. A lasting recovery in the United Kingdom balance of payments 
is all the more desirable since regular servicing of its debts, other 
than those denominated in sterling, will require substantial payments 
surpluses over a fairly long period. During 1969, the servicing of 
long- and medium-term debts, mainly because of certain large sums 
becoming due to the IMF, has entailed considerable difficulties. 
According to official information published early in the year, the 
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total of these debts (excluding sterling balances and short-term 
debts to central banks) was more than £3 000 million, and payments 
of some £630 million (including interest) should have been made 
during the present year; some of the deadlines were readjusted after 
negotiation. The amounts to be paid in 1970 and 1971 should, 
on an annual average, be about £300 million (including interest). 
The figures concerning total short-term official indebtedness to 
monetary authorities who took part in the support of sterling are 
not available; they are in any case liable to fluctuations, which can 
sometimes be abrupt. 
This analysis shows that the constraints which will in the next few 
years be imposed on the British economy by the need to achieve a 
lasting recovery in the balance of payments and to repay the debts 
contracted since 1965 should not be ignored when, during any 
negotiations, the nature and details of a transitional period are 
being established. 
25. With regard to the sterling balances, the Commission considered 
that the previous arrangements for dealing with this hazard were 
insufficient. The question today is whether the new agreements 
concluded in September 1968 are sufficient to dispel the concern 
that can be felt in this connection. 
The arrangements made are twofold. In the first place, the United 
Kingdom gives the sterling area countries a dollar-value guarantee 
on that proportion of their official sterling holdings exceeding 10% 
of their reserves. In return, these countries undertake to maintain 
a minimum proportion of their reserves in sterling. Most of the 
agreements, concluded bilaterally between the United Kingdom 
and each of the sterling area countries, are for a period of three 
years; they will be reviewed six months before expiry. 
Secondly, the Bank for International Settlements, in agreement 
with 12 central banks, has accorded to the United Kingdom a 
credit facility of £2 000 million, i.e. less than a third of the United 
Kingdom's current sterling commitments to the sterling area 
countries. This amount is designed to offset the immediate effect on 
the United Kingdom's reserves of any reduction below the agreed 
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minimum level of the sterling balances held by public authorities 
and private persons in the overseas countries of the area. 
Drawings may be made until September 1971; repayments must 
take place between the sixth and the tenth year after the signing 
of the agreement. 
26. If it is borne in mind that the main object of the arrangements 
in question was to eliminate a tendency for countries with sterling 
balances to diversify their reserves and so to provide a temporary 
solution to an urgent problem, there is no doubt that they have so 
far been crowned with success: not only have withdrawals ceased, 
but the balances held by public authorities in the sterling area 
countries have grown, rising from £1 506 million at the end of 
September 1968 to £1 847 million at the end of March 1969 and 
£1 906 mHlion at the end of June. It is much more difficult to say 
how far these agreements contribute to the solution of the problem 
raised in the Commission's Opinion. At present, when one considers 
the effect produced by the Basle Agreements on the current figure 
of sterling balances, it would seem that these agreements have helped 
to consolidate the role of sterling as a reserve currency. If this 
tendency were to continue, the short-term result would undoubtedly 
be to' make it easier for the United Kingdom to finance its balance 
of payments. In the longer term, the fate of an increased amount 
in sterling balances would depend, failing an indefinite renewal of 
the agreements, on the confidence of creditors in sterling, i.e. in 
the last analysis on the strength of the United Kingdom balance of 
payments. 
27. The central banks of the Community countries made an 
important but only partial contribution to the Basle Agreement of 
September 1968: a lasting and effective solution to the problem 
of the sterling balances goes beyond the financial potential of the 
Community countries alone. Moreover, this problem, which in 
essence is international since the sterling reserves constitute a 
part of world liquidity, could be dealt with correctly only within 
the framework of the international monetary institutions. However, 
this problem-and whatever solution may be found-is sufficiently 
important for the functioning of an enlarged Community that it 
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should be thoroughly discussed between the Community and the 
United Kingdom; the discussions would establish certain guidelines 
in this field and the conditions on which the Community would 
participate in any international action that might be taken. 
28. Although the devaluation of sterling has opened the road to the 
solution of certain problems posed in the Opinion of 29 September 
1967 and may help towards the adaptation which membership to 
the Community would impose on the United Kingdom, the pattern 
of developments in the foreign currency liabilities of the United 
Kingdom and in the sterling balances is less clear. The prospects 
in this field should therefore be discussed with the United Kingdom 
Government. 
There have at times been attempts from various quarters to propose 
rapid solutions to problems which are of extreme complexity. It 
is not for instance sufficient to look at the United Kingdom's 
external liabilities and make that country's liabilities seem less 
formidable by setting against them a list of its private and public 
assets abroad, for between the liabilities and the assets in question 
there are the considerable differences of nature and liquidity. 
Again, it seems overbold to imagine that even the temporary use of 
various technical procedures in the administration of exchange 
rates would be likely to eliminate these difficulties, the solution of 
which depends mainly on the compliance of each country with the 
rules which ensure the achievement of fundamental equilibria and, 
within the Community, on a more effective co-ordination of economic 
policies. 
29 . In this respect, the idea expressed in the Opinion of 
29 September 1967 that "it would not be enough if the countries 
applying for membership merely stated their agreement with 
general objectives: they should also accept the priorities that 
advancing Community co-ordination has made it possible to 
establish both internally and at international level" remains 
fundamental for the Commission. 
It assumes particular importance in view of the results obtained by 
the Community in the international monetary negotiations which 
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led to a reform of the Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund and to the creation of the special drawing rights 
system. 
Its importance is further enhanced by the Council's decisions, taken 
on 17 July 1969, that the medium-term economic policies of the 
Member States should be more fully concerted, the co-ordination of 
current economic policies made more effective and monetary 
co-operation in the Community implemented by appropriate means. 
This will enable unduly serious disequilibria between Community 
countries to be prevented and the conditions governing the 
maintenance of stable intra-Community exchange rates to be more 
adequately fulfilled-stable exchange rates are required not only 
because without them common agricultural prices are impossible 
but even more because without them transactions within the 
Common Market cannot be made with confidence and will not 
expand. 
In setting out on this path, the Member States of the present 
Community are approaching a new phase in the construction of the 
Community, a stage which must eventually lead to the establishment 
of a Community monetary system. The cohesion and the 
dynamism of an enlarged Community will depend largely on the 
acceptance by the candidate countries of the objectives and 
methods underlying this new venture. 
Chapter 3 
The practical problems 
(a) Problems raised by simultaneity of the applications 
30. It will be necessary to know whether, in view of the problems 
raised by the fact that four States are at present candidates for 
membership, it is better to stagger the negotiations, with the 
intention that all four States should join the Community at the 
same time, or to stagger the dates of joining, starting with the United 
Kingdom, on whose membership that of the other applicants depends. 
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Quite apart from the political and economic consequences-
important both for the applicant countries and for the Community-
and from the difficulty there would be in working out different 
transitional arrangements for each of the new members, spreading 
the accessions over a period of time would entail institutional 
problems that would outweigh any benefits. The prospect of 
further countries joining could not be left out of account during 
negotiations with the first country. It would therefore be necessary 
to begin by working out provisional arrangements for certain States, 
subsequently making definitive arrangements to take effect once the 
last member was in, and to ensure that the definitive arrangements 
would also suit the members whose entry had been held up. 
31. Because of these drawbacks it is hardly possible to envisage 
staggering the dates for membership: it would surely be better to 
have some staggering of the negotiations. This latter method 
should not exclude the requisite co-ordination on questions that 
cannot be settled in isolation at each set of negotiations. In any 
case, the institutional adjustments cannot be negotiated until 
agreement has been reached with the four applicants on all the 
other problems. The four treaties of accession (plus perhaps a 
fifth with Sweden) would then come into force simultaneously. 
32. If, however, the negotiations or ratification procedures were 
to be delayed appreciably in respect of one or more applicant 
countries, or if any country were to find, during or at the end of the 
negotiations, that it could not maintain its application for 
membership, alternative arrangements would have to be made to 
enable the other applicants to join the Community. 
(b) Problems involved in actual entry 
33. In view of the imminent completion of the transitional period 
and the problems of adjustment this will involve, there can no 
longer be any question of the new members having to "catch up" 
with the Six immediately and in all fields. It would seem logical 
that there should be transitional arrangements extending over a 
number of years. 
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Three essential points must be made here: 
(i) The purpose of the transitional arrangements would be to spread 
over a period the economic consequences resulting from the 
application of the Community rules by the new members. In 
areas where transitional measures proved inevitable, they should not 
prevent the new members from adopting as rapidly as possible the 
legal framework and the instruments established by the Community 
rules. The transitional adjustments ought then to disappear 
according to a prearranged timetable. 
The legal framework and implementing mechanisms would 
presumably have to be adopted immediately in the case of the 
agricultural market organizations and the rules governing the 
customs union. 
(ii) Another question is whether it is possible and desirable to have 
different transitional periods for industry and agriculture. The 
Community has always endeavoured to keep liberalization of 
industrial goods and establishment of the agricultural common 
market more or less in step. This principle should be maintained 
when new members are admitted. 
(iii) Lastly, if the date of entry into force of the treaties and the 
timing of the transitional measures-especially as regards 
movement of goods-were to vary for different products or were to 
be adapted to the specific problems of each State acceding, the 
Community would come up against very serious difficulties 
(deflection of trade, administrative complications, particularly as 
regards the control of origin, risks of error or of disputes, and so 
on). It would therefore be advisable for the timetable to be the 
same for all concerned and for waivers or exceptions to be kept 
to a minimum. 
Chapter 4 
Economic integration in Europe 
34. Alongside the applications for full membership, and in most 
cases because of these applications, a number of European countries, 
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particularly EFTA members, have made it known that they wish to 
open negotiations with the Community for the purpose of 
establishing special relations. Consequently, the prospects of 
enlargement bring the Community face to face with the problem 
of the economic organization of a large part of Europe. 
35. The gradual establishment of the common market has already 
exerted considerable attraction on the countries neighbouring the 
Community: association agreements have been concluded with 
Greece and Turkey, and negotiations with a view to preferential 
agreements have been opened with Austria and Spain and are 
envisaged with Malta. 
The prospect of the Community being enlarged induced Switzerland 
in 1961 to ask that negotiations be opened. The Swiss Government 
has made it known to the Community on a number of occasions, the 
last quite recently, that it considers its 1961 application to be still 
pending. 
Similarly, in 1962, the Governments of Portugal and Cyprus 
requested negotiations, and in various ways they have made it 
clear that these applications still stand. 
The Finnish Government, without making a direct approach to the 
Community, has on several occasions made statements advocating 
Finland's participation, in some form consistent with its neutrality, 
in the economic integration of Europe. 
And finally it appears that, if the negotiations with Sweden did not 
lead to membership, it would still be the chief objective of the 
Swedish Government to establish special relations with an enlarged 
Community. 
36. The countries of southern Europe, which are at a stage of 
economic development that rules out any idea of immediate 
membership of the Community, should be able to establish 
with an enlarged Community preferential relations so conceived that 
their development would benefit. Such relations could not take the 
form of association proper except in the case of those countries 
whose institutions and regimes are comparable with those of the 
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founder States. The others might be offered agreements that 
would enable the Community to take account of their subsequent 
evolutions. 
On the other hand, for countries which are sufficiently developed 
economically and possess institutions and regimes comparable with 
those of the founder States, the Community has always considered 
that full membership was the arrangement that accorded best 
with the objectives of the Treaties. The drawbacks of association 
agreements or preferential agreements with such countries are well 
known: first, these countries might in certain cases have to comply 
with decisions in the taking of which they had had no part, and 
second, the commitments on consultation and the multiplicity of 
special arrangements would make for inextricable complications for 
the Community. The Commission therefore considers that the 
Community should not normally contemplate agreements of this 
kind except with such countries as could not become full members 
because of their international circumstances; and even this it 
should do only after taking every possible precaution to ensure that 
its decisions would continue to be made in full independence and 
that its operation was not unduly complicated. 
37. Once the essential arrangements for the accession of new 
members have been defined, the Community could examine with 
the other European countries involved the problems that arise-
particularly those due to the fact that most of these countries 
and the candidates for membership all belong to the large 
preferential trading area of EFT A. 
The Commission considers, however, that this problem can be 
examined profitably only at a later stage in the process of enlarging 
the Community. It also reserves the right to inform the Council at 
that time of the action it thinks should be taken. 
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TITLE II 
STRENGTHENING OF THE COMMUNITY 
Chapter 1 
The Community's future development 
38. The Community is about to reach the end of the transitional 
period. Some important decisions still have to be taken, but it may 
be expected that the timetables laid down in the Treaties will, as a 
whole, be complied with. 
But it is important to avoid the Community's achievements being 
threatened by the pull of divergent forces; it is therefore both 
necessary and urgent for the Community to be strengthened. The 
members of the Council have expressed themselves to this effect on 
a number of occasions, in particular at their meeting of 22 July 1969. 
The Commission has repeatedly insisted on the need for such 
strengthening, particularly in its statement of 1 July 1968 and in the 
Introduction to the Second General Report on the Activities of the 
Communities. 
39. The Commission furthermore stresses, as it did in its Opinion 
of 29 September 1967, that the cohesion and the dynamism which 
are indispensable for the Community depend in part on the 
convergence of the national policies of the Member States, in 
particular, but not exclusively, of their foreign and defence policies. 
The Commission is well aware that the Member States have as yet 
done nothing to put into practice the intentions they have expressed 
on this subject. The action to be taken in this field can only be 
worked out gradually, and it will always have to be kept in mind 
that, as the Community develops, such action will necessarily play 
an increasingly determinant role in its existence, its orientation and 
its cohesion. 
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40. So far the Community's chief task has been to work out concrete 
and precise rules for applying those provisions in the Treaties which 
require the removal of obstacles to freedom of movement in the 
Community. Once these rules were adopted, their implementation 
was more often than not a matter for day-to-day administration 
and required few political decisions. 
The gradual transition from the customs union to the economic 
union will on the other hand require not only the return to normal 
functioning of the Community institutions but even their 
strengthening. It is also important that the Community should 
have the appropriate tools to ensure the success of whatever action 
is needed for the transition to be carried out smoothly. 
With this in view the Commission has already sent to the Council the 
following proposals: 
(i) Commission memorandum on the pursuit of the studies on 
Technological Co-operation (Doc. SEC(68)1524 of 15 May 1968); 
(ii) Memorandum on the Reform of Agriculture in the European 
Economic Community (Doc. COM(68)1000 of 18 December 1968); 
(iii) Commission memorandum to the Council on the "First 
Guidelines for a Community Energy Policy" (Doc. COM(68)1040 of 
17 January 1969); 
(iv) Commission memorandum to the Council on the Co-ordination 
of Economic Policies and Monetary Co-operation within the 
Community (Doc. COM(69)150 of 12 February 1969); 
(v) Proposal for a decision on the gradual standardization of 
agreements concerning Member States' commercial relations 
with non-member countries and the negotiation of Community 
agreements (Doc. COM(69)126 of 25 February 1969); 
(vi) Commission memorandum to the Council concerning Euratom's 
future activities (Doc. COM(69)350 of 23 April1969); 
(vii) Commission Opinion on the reform of the European Social 
Fund by virtue of Article 126 of the EEC Treaty (Doc. COM(69)347 
of 4 May 1969); 
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(viii) Commission memorandum to the Council on replacing the 
financial contributions of the Member States by the Communities' 
own resources and on greater budgetary powers for the European 
Parliament (Doc. COM(69)700 of 16 July 1969). 
41. In the longer term, some time will be necessary to narrow, as 
a preliminary step, the divergences between the economic policies of 
the Member States and, subsequently, to define and implement 
Community policies. However, this twofold action is not equally 
urgent in all sectors; on the contrary, it can be staggered in the light 
of the priorities attaching to the various fields. For instance, the 
common bases for an economic and monetary policy which would 
ensure smooth transition from the customs union to the economic 
union should be laid down as rapidly as possible. 
Chapter 2 
Strengthening and enlargement 
42. To strengthen the Community in this way means not only 
consolidating what it has already achieved and ensuring its further 
development, but also making suitable arrangements for receiving 
the candidate countries. It is in this setting of the measures to be 
taken and of the time needed for their execution that the problem of 
enlarging the Community is to be seen. 
It is advisable to deal pari passu with the decisions on strengthening 
and the replies to be given to the applications for membership. But 
we must also make sure that the decisions concerning enlargement 
do not delay the important decisions on the action required to 
strengthen the Community. 
43. In view of the link between strengthening and enlargement, 
the candidate countries will have to express, at the opening of the 
negotiations, their agreement not only with the principle of accepting 
the progress which the Community has already made-that is to 
say the Treaties plus the decisions taken since they came into 
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force-but also, with full knowledge of the measures already decided 
on or now being through with the principle of strengthening the 
Community. 
The aim of these measures is to solve the problems which confront 
both the founder States and the candidates, who must all ensure the 
balanced and satisfactory growth of their economies, improve the 
efficacy of their production apparatus and, in a more general way, 
take up the many and varied challenges stemming from the constant 
changes that are inevitable in modern industrial societies. The 
agreements of principle demanded of the candidate countries should 
therefore not constitute an obstacle to the negotiations. 
It is nevertheless important to be able to make sure during the 
negotiations that, if they should be successful, the said agreements 
of principle will be actually embodied in the reality of an enlarged 
Community. 
In this respect it would be helpful if the candidate countries pursued 
policies convergent with those implemented in the Community. In 
this way they would be able to establish their economies on more 
solid foundations, while at the same time achieving some part of the 
adaptation necessary for full participation in the activities of an 
enlarged Community. 
This action by the candidate States would facilitate the early 
solution of the many and varied problems raised when they accept 
what the Community has already achieved; it would also make it 
possible, if the negotiations prove successful, to keep the duration 
and the scope of the transitional measures down to a minimum. 
The convergent policies thus pursued simultaneously by the founder 
States and the candidate States during the earlier part of the 
negotiations would help at a later stage to strengthen an enlarged 
Community and in any case to avoid the mechanical effects of 
enlargement weakening or watering down the present Community. 
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TITLE III 
FUNCTIONING OF THE INSTITUTIONS 
Chapter 1 
General 
44. The concern expressed on many occasions by the Commission 
and in the Council about the conditions required for the smooth 
working of the Communities cannot but be increased by the prospect 
of negotiations on an exceptionally large scale and of the foreseeable 
consequences of the accessions that might result. 
Any increase in the number of Member States is likely to make 
institutional mechanisms more cumbersome. The adjustments 
needed-these are in fact provided for in Article 237 of the EEC 
Treaty-should therefore be made in such a way as to maintain 
the efficacy of the system and to offset the mechanical effects 
of enlargement. 
The need to ensure the efficacy and to maintain the role of the 
institutional machinery in an enlarged Community becomes clearer 
still when one considers that the transition to a real economic union 
involves a substantial number of decisions that will have to be 
spread over a period of time. To the extent, however, that these 
decisions can be fitted into rigid and exact timetables, due account 
should be taken of the constantly evolving and often unpredictable 
character of the underlying realities and of the speed with which 
action has to be taken in such matters. 
45. The problem of improving and strengthening the institutional 
machinery must be tackled in any case. The Community has 
become a large entity that has to be governed and administered in 
the same way as the territory of any country. The Commission has 
already drawn attention to this problem, particularly. in its 
statement of 1 July 1968 and in the Introduction to the Second 
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General Report on the Activities of the Communities. The 
prospect of enlargement only makes these tasks of improvement 
and strengthening more immediate and more urgent than ever. 
Chapter 2 
Improvements to the functioning of the institutions 
in the Community as it is today 
46. Agreement ought therefore to be reached as soon as possible 
within the Community, and at latest by the end of the negotiations, 
that the functioning of all the Community institutions should be 
reviewed. 
(a) The Parliament 
47. As the Community develops, as its common policies are worked 
out and put into effect, as the influence exerted by the Community 
over national policies becomes clearer, a better institutional balance 
must be established, in which the Parliament and its powers of 
supervision would play a bigger part than was originally assigned to 
them. Consequently, the following two steps will have to be taken 
without delay. 
The first is to give the Parliament real budgetary powers. Article 
201 of the Treaty lays down that once the common customs tariff 
has been definitively introduced the Community is to have its own 
sources of revenue without the money passing through the budgets 
of the Member States. This will in itself necessitate an extension of 
the Parliament's supervisory powers-a point that has recently 
been made on many occasions by the Council and the Commission. 
The Commission is at present submitting precise proposals on this 
point to the Council. It is to be hoped that rapid agreement will 
prove possible, since any decisions taken will have to be ratified by 
the national parliaments. 
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The second is the election of the European Parliament by universal 
suffrage-another development explicitly required by the Treaties. 
The matter is by now one of topical interest, and here again it may 
be hoped that a general agreement is not too far away. 
Successful action on these matters would be in itself a considerable 
step forward and would substantially strengthen the institutional 
structure of the Community. 
(b) The Council 
48. The efficacy of the Council's decision-making methods has 
become a major problem in the institutional life of the Community. 
It is impaired first and foremost by application of the unanimity rule 
in cases where the Treaties do not require it. This explains why 
many questions have remained unsettled for months and even years. 
The progress of integration has thus been appreciably slowed down 
and sometimes completely blocked. The delays affecting the 
Community's relations with the rest of the world, particularly in its 
commercial policy, and the high cost of certain aspects 
of the agricultural policy are, to a large extent, a result of these 
institutional aberrations. And these drawbacks are likely to be 
even more numerous in an enlarged Community. 
Another difficulty is that a number of member countries have 
refused and still refuse, because of differences of opinion with the 
other members, to join in the search for compromise solutions 
acceptable to all. This practice of imposing a "veto" would have 
even more serious consequences in an enlarged Community. 
To meet these difficulties, two principles should be accepted and 
acted upon without delay: 
(i) Decisions by majority vote should again become the normal 
practice of the Council in all fields where the Treaties do not 
explicitly require the contrary. 
(ii) There are also fields in which the unanimous agreement of Council 
members is required. Among them are those areas where the 
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Treaties merely lay down general objectives while the procedures 
for putting them into effect are only sketchily defined or would 
mean the issue by the Community of a whole set of laws and 
regulations. In these cases unanimity should be required only 
on the outline decisions-those laying down the targets in each 
specific field and perhaps the broad lines of procedure to be followed 
-with majority voting for the implementing decisions that remain. 
(c) The Commission 
49. The counterpart of majority voting in the Council is the 
Commission's independence and its right to initiate legislation. 
Under the institutional arrangements laid down in the Treaties, the 
legitimate interests of the minority are protected by the fact that 
unanimity is required before a Commission proposal can be altered. 
The right of initiative, independence and authority of the 
Commission, then, are of absolutely basic importance for the 
efficient functioning of the Community. This is all the more true 
now that the Community has completed the first period of build-up 
and is now moving on to a period concerned with the management 
of current business. 
Consequently, further powers of management should gradually be 
transferred to the Commission as agreement is reached on the new 
objectives to be attained and as the Community is strengthened. 
The balance between the institutions of the Community, which gives 
the Commission responsibility for the day-to-day running of affairs 
in close liaison with the Council and the Member States, should be 
fully maintained and developed. The agricultural management 
committees could serve as an example in many other fields. 
The Commission wishes to stress its conviction that it is only by 
returning to respect for both the letter and the spirit of the 
institutional arrangements laid down in the Treaty, by ensuring 
that they operate efficiently and by strengthening them in the light 
of developments and the requirements of Community life, that the 
Community will be able to accept in security the risks involved 
in enlargement. 
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Chapter 3 
The institutions of an enlarged Community 
50. If the institutional machinery of the present Community is 
strengthened and supplemented along these lines, the problems 
raised in this field by the enlargement of the Community will be less 
important and less intractable. 
The Treaties properly use the word "adjustments" to denote the 
limited nature of the changes that will prove necessary. 
The Commission has already dealt with this point in its September 
1967 Opinion and has only a few comments to add. 
(i) The Parliament 
51. The enlargement of the Community would lead to an increase 
in the membership of the European Parliament. 
On this occasion there should be a review of the distribution of seats 
among the representatives of the peoples of the Community 
countries. 
(ii) The Council 
52. A number of difficult problems arise from the enlargement of 
the Community. 
First, it will scarcely be possible to contemplate eliminating the 
decisions requiring unanimity and replacing them in every case by 
majority decisions. Where unanimity was still required, the risk 
of inaction could be diminished if it were possible during the 
membership negotiations to work out a fairly broad consensus on 
the further action, whether provided for in the Treaties or not, that 
urgently needed to be undertaken; enlargement could thus be 
effected in the best possible conditions from the outset and the 
de facto solidarity required if the enlarged Community is to work 
properly could be established among its members as quickly as 
possible. 
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Then there are the problems of weighting members' votes and the 
level of the qualified majority. As regards this last point, existing 
arrangements would have to be adjusted in an enlarged Community 
in such a way that its ability to act was preserved. 
This would be all the more necessary because an increase in the 
number of Member States could mean that national interests and 
considerations of immediate political expediency might be even 
more divergent than before. 
In any case, the level of the qualified majority should be determined 
in such a way as not to detract from the power of this provision to 
deter any State tempted to prolong a discussion indefinitely. 
Minority interests should be guaranteed by making it a general rule 
that no majority decision can be taken except on a proposal from the 
Commission. 
(iii) The Commission 
53. Deciding on the number of members of the Commission as a 
consequence of enlarging the Community, apart from the questions 
arising simply from concern that Community mechanisms should be 
effective, will raise a problem of balance that should be dealt with 
during the negotiations. The Commission must be in a position 
to play its role fully. Its collegiate character and the desire for 
impartiality require that its membership should be kept to the 
m1mmum. 
The Commission does not believe that it would be politically feasible 
at the Communities' present stage of development to envisage an 
arrangement under which the Commission would not include 
nationals of all Member States. 
It also considers that to increase the number of Commissioners, 
though it would add to the total of personal ability, would be bound 
to make the functioning of the Commission more cumbersome. 
The size of the Commission should therefore be decided with an eye 
to both its collegiate character and the demands of efficiency. 
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(iv) The Court of Justice 
54. The accession of new members presents hardly any difficulties 
as regards this institution. 
When, however, the number of judges is increased, care should be 
taken that the total is still an odd number, as required by the 
Protocol on the Statute of the Court. 
(v) The Economic and Social Committee, Euratom's Scientific and 
Technical Committee and the ECSC Consultative Committee 
55. In the case of these Committees enlargement would entail a 
corresponding increase in the number of members. Everything 
should be done to ensure that Committee members represent as 
fully as possible the interests in whose name they have been 
appointed. 
56. It would be well if the attention of the applicant countries were 
drawn to the development that the Community's institutional 
machinery is likely to undergo in the future. 
This is first of all because the powers of the institutions are allocated 
and defined differently in each of the three Treaties of Paris and 
Rome and because it is difficult at the present stage to foresee what 
the institutions will be as a result of the Treaty merging the existing 
Communities. 
A further reason is that the role of the European Parliament can 
logically be expected to expand. In its July 1969 proposals on the 
creation of the Community's "own resources" and on the budgetary 
powers of the Parliament, the Commission expressed the view that 
from 1974 onwards the European Parliament should be endowed 
with legislative powers. 
The current Treaties, essential as they are, are only one step towards 
the construction of an increasingly united and institutionalized 
Europe. The applicant countries must be fully aware of the fact 
that they are not only joining an economic and social undertaking, 
but that they will be required to participate fully in creating a 
continent which is economically and politically united. 
s. 9 I 1 o - 1969 37 

TITLE IV 
REMARKS ON PROCEDURE 
The Commission believes that the time has come to draw the 
Council's attention to the following comments on the procedure 
for the negotiations. 
Prior examination by the Six 
57. The Council will recall that its examination of the Commission's 
Opinion begun in October 1967 was interrupted at a relatively early 
stage because of the political divergences of opinion then existing 
between the Member States and that it was never completed. 
The Commission feels that it would be desirable if, prior to the 
opening of negotiations proper by the Community, the Council were 
to resume its examination of the Commission's Opinion of 
29 September 1967 in conjunction with that of 1 October 1969 
and to determine the main lines of the position to be defended 
by the Community when negotiations begin. 
Content of the negotiations 
58. An effort will have to be made, both in the preliminary 
examination described above and in the negotiations proper, to 
concentrate on the important issues involving political, economic 
or social choices. Negotiations must not get bogged down in 
detailed discussions on all the minor problems. 
In this respect the negotiations of 1961-63 seem to have gone into 
too much detail in certain areas. The debates on kangaroo meat 
are still quoted as the supreme example of this excessive 
perfectionism. It would be well to concentrate on essentials 
during the negotiations, leaving to the institutions of the enlarged 
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Community the task of settling less important problems not 
resolved during the negotiations. 
The Commission is prepared, once the Council considers the time 
ripe for such a step, to submit a list of the essential points on which, 
in its view, agreement should be reached during the negotiations 
themselves. 
Negotiating procedure 
59. The Council will recall that, on the previous occasion, the 
entire negotiations were entrusted to an intergovernmental 
conference which met in Brussels at ministerial level and, between 
meetings at deputies' level. This extremely long and cumbersome 
procedure did not lead to success. 
The Commission does not consider that Article 237 of the Treaty of 
Rome necessarily requires a technique of this kind. Without 
wishing to get involved in legal controversy, it doubts if this 
Article entrusts the Member States meeting in the Council with the 
task of negotiating individually with non-member countries on 
Community policies already formulated and in operation, such as 
customs tariff policy or the common commercial policy, over 
which they no longer have individual control. 
But it is also convinced that this negotiating technique is not a very 
happy one. By the very fact of negotiating individually with 
non-member countries, the Member States accentuate rather than 
play down the differences between their points of view. The non-
member countries themselves are tempted to divide the Member 
States and to conduct talks with them in parallel, and this damages 
the cohesion of the Community, hardens positions and finally, as 
was seen in 1962, creates a situation conducive to failure rather than 
success. 
The Commission therefore feels that the Community would be well 
advised to draw on the experience it has gained in the various 
important negotiations it has conducted and on this occasion to 
divide the negotiations into two phases. 
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The first phase would be conducted on the same lines as the Kennedy 
Round. The Commission would be given a mandate to negotiate 
on behalf of the Community; it would keep the Council constantly 
informed and would follow the directives given it by the Council. 
It will be remembered that this method worked well for four years 
during the Kennedy Round and led to the success of the negotiations, 
to the satisfaction of the Council and of the Member States. This 
phase of the negotiations would embrace the problems posed by 
common policies already in operation or in course of elaboration 
(common external tariff, common agricultural policy and so on), 
for which Community-type negotiations seem particularly 
appropriate. 
There would then be a second phase, conducted by the Member 
States meeting within the Council. Once they had decided on the 
acceptability of the results achieved during the first phase, the 
Member States would devote themselves first and foremost to the 
more peculiarly political issues, such as the general political 
problems resulting from the enlargement of the Community, 
institutional problems, and the adjustments to be made to the 
texts of the Treaties. 
The Commission is convinced that a procedure of this kind, which 
has proved its worth in the past, would allow of more coherent, more 
dynamic and also more rapid negotiations and that it would offer a 
greater chance of success. When the time comes, it would be well 
to discuss this procedure with the non-member countries concerned. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
60. At the close of this analysis of the main problems arising in the 
context of enlargement, the Commission finds that the general lines 
and conclusions of its 1967 Opinion are still valid. 
Because, however, of the changes which have occurred in the 
meantime, it has examined the problems of strengthening the 
Community in the context of its enlargement in greater detail than 
it did in 1967. It has come to the conclusion that, because of the 
close links between these two issues, they must be considered 
simultaneously rather than treated separately. 
61. As regards strengthening, the Community cannot stop where it 
now is. One of two things can happen; either, under the pressure of 
the divergent forces already in evidence, the Community will, 
paradoxically, allow its unity to be impaired just when the customs 
union has been completed at great cost in terms of effort and the 
pace of technological progress is steadily adding to the advantages 
offered by a large single market; or, by using the Community 
institutions to assure convergence of the policies followed by 
Member States, it will consolidate and widen the results obtained 
to the benefit of all. 
It is therefore essential to make the necessary progress in the 
sectors (agricultural, economic and monetary, social, institutional, 
etc.) which have been stressed as being important in the present 
document. The Commission has already made various proposals in 
this direction. Action has already begun within the Community. 
It must be pursued and reinforced. 
62. The enlargement of the Community to include new members 
must not be a brake on this action. Only a strong Community can 
provide a suitable framework for receiving the applicant States. 
The applicants can consider their request for membership only 
against a background such as this. At the beginning of the 
negotiations, they will have to state their agreement not only 
with the principle of accepting what has been attained by the 
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Community-in other words, the Treaties plus the decisions taken 
since these came into force-but also, in full knowledge of the 
measures agreed on or in course of implementation within the 
Community, with the principle of strengthening the Community. 
Finally, they will need to adopt policies that are convergent with 
those pursued in the Community thus ensuring its reinforcement. 
63. The Commission considers that the framework described and 
the principles to which attention has been drawn in its 1967 and 
1969 Opinions could well facilitate a joint examination, with the 
candidates for membership, of the problems posed by enlargement 
of the Community and could contribute to the search for solutions 
which would make it possible to establish conditions that guaranteed 
the cohesion and dynamism essential to an enlarged Community. 
This should be the aim of the negotiations. In the Commission's 
opinion they should be opened as soon as possible. 
44 s. 9/10- 1969 
ANNEX 

A. Customs Union and Economic Union 

CHAPTER I 
THE CUSTOMS UNION 
1. According to Article 9 of the EEC Treaty, the Community is 
based upon a customs union. It is on this foundation that the 
general objectives set out in Article 2 are gradually being achieved, 
largely by means of the common policies. 
The experience gained in the last few years of Community activities 
confirms that the customs union is the key to the establishment and 
the development of the Community. 
Every precaution must therefore be taken to make sure that the 
accession of new States interferes neither with the component 
parts nor with the working of the customs union, and that the 
negotiations and later the unavoidable transitional arrangements 
do not result in the postponement of the decisions which the 
Community still has to take before the customs union is fully 
established. 
(a) New dimensions 
2. The accession of four new members would lead to a considerable 
expansion of the volume of trade within the common market and 
with non-member countries. 
On the basis of the figures for 1968, intra-Community trade (exports 
fob from each Member State to every other Member State) would 
rise from $28 400 million for the Six to $41 200 million for the 
enlarged Community. 
For the same year, exports fob to non-member countries would rise 
from $35 300 million for the present Community to $43 600 million 
for the enlarged Community, and imports cif from non-member 
countries would rise from $33 500 million to $46 400 million. These 
figures show that enlargement of the Community would considerably 
enhance its position as a major world importer (38%). The 
expansiOn m the volume of its exports would be less (24%). 
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3. These figures do not of course make allowance for the expansion 
of preferential trade which would result from the gradual elimination 
of customs duties and other obstacles to trade within the enlarged 
customs union. Although it cannot be expected that this expansion 
would be as rapid as that experienced in the EEC between 1958 and 
1968 (from $6 800 million to $28 400 million), the obstacles to trade 
having already been eliminated inside the EEC on the one hand 
and inside EFTA on the other, it can be assumed that enlargement of 
the customs union would contribute to economic expansion in 
Western Europe. 
(b) Abolition of obstacles to intra-Community trade 
4. Obstacles to trade already eliminated in the Community at the 
date of accession would have to be eliminated from trade between 
the old and the new members during the transitional period. This 
applies of course not only to customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions but also to charges with effect equivalent to customs 
duties and to measures with effect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions. 
In the accession treaties, the new members would have to assume 
specific obligations regarding the abolition of any measures of this 
type at present known and in force on their respective territories. 
Unilateral measures of the type adopted by the United Kingdom in 
1964 with a view to restoring equilibrium in its balance of payments1 
would, of course, be ruled out. 
State monopolies of a commercial nature2 would also have to be 
adjusted as provided for by the Treaty of Rome. 
5. The problems of manufactures based on certain agricultural 
products, dealt with inter alia in Regulations Nos. 160/66 and 
1059/68, also call for special attention: the system at present used 
in the Community should be applied in dealing with the new 
members as long as the latter do not fully apply the provisions 
of the common agricultural policy for the products used as raw 
materials. 
1 15% surcharge applied even to imports from its EFTA partner countries. 
2 This should also apply to the United Kingdom coal importing arrangements. 
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This problem is of special importance in view of the very appreciable 
extent to which the processing industries of certain candidates are 
likely to compete with the food industry of the Six. 
6. The accession agreements cannot rule out the use of safeguard 
measures, which allow exceptions to the rule of free movement of 
goods where there are economic difficulties or deflection of trade. 
These measures, similar to those provided for in Articles 115 and 226 
of the EEC Treaty and elsewhere, should be laid down for the 
transitional period by the accession treaties. The present members 
of the Community would of course have to constitute one unit for the 
application of these measures after the expiry of the present 
Community's own period of transition. 
The increase in the number of member countries and the greater 
diversity of their economies could mean more frequent resort to 
safeguard measures unless it were possible to avoid these by the 
co-ordination of commercial and industrial policies which will have 
to be undertaken. 
7. The elimination-even if it were gradual-of the obstacles to 
trade in an enlarged Community could give rise to certain difficulties 
in some "sensitive" industries which were singled out for special 
treatment in the Kennedy Round. 
The enlargement of the market should help to step up productivity 
and encourage necessary adaptation, but the conditions of 
competition must not be distorted. Difficulties can be foreseen, 
for instance, in the paper and paperboard industry, because of the 
privileged access of the Nordic countries to the raw material and 
the cartellization of the Scandinavian paper industry. The very 
considerable divergences of commercial and industrial policy 
between the United Kingdom and the Community in an industry 
such as textiles could also raise delicate problems for the 
Community's industry, which will in any case, as a consequence of 
agreements recently concluded in Geneva, have to leave a growing 
part of the market to imports from the developing countries. 
Excessive differences in energy costs would prevent the Community's 
ferro-alloy industry from coping with Scandinavian competition. 
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Lastly, particular attention will have to be paid to the problems 
arising from the extent of American investment in certain areas 
of British industry, such as the motor and agricultural tractor 
industries. 
8. In order to remedy the foreseeable difficulties in sensitive 
industries such as those of which examples have been given above, 
measures of industrial policy will have to be taken to facilitate 
indispensable adaptation. If in exceptional cases co-ordination of 
policies should not permit the causes of distortion to be eliminated, 
special transitional or adaptation measures might prove to be 
necessary. 
(c) Application of the common customs tariff (CCT) 
9. The present candidates for membership appear to be willing to 
adopt the common customs tariff and the rules in this field 
contained in the Treaty of Paris. It is equally indispensable that 
they should accept the provisions for its uniform application 
which will meanwhile have been adopted. 
10. During the transitional period which they will be granted, the 
special position of the new members in relation to the present 
members of the Community will inevitably pose delicate problems. 
These difficulties would be greatly reduced if the pace at which the 
common customs tariff is introduced and that at which the mutual 
adaptation of customs duties is implemented were fixed in such a 
way as to limit the possibilities of deflection of trade. 
11. Pari passu with this action, and for the same length of time, the 
conditions under which the new members would relinquish the 
EFTA tariff arrangements would have to be determined from the 
point of view of the Community's interests. 
12. The application of the common customs tariff by the 
United Kingdom would mean a fundamental change in trading 
conditions between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, 
Commonwealth preferences being replaced by Community 
preferences. For this reason the British decision to accept the 
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CCT is qualified by a reference to the provisional agreements 
reached in the course of the 1961-63 negotiations (association of 
certain Commonwealth countries and territories in Africa and 
the Caribbean, far-reaching commercial agreements with India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon). 
The problems raised by the relations of an enlarged Community with 
the countries of the Commonwealth and the possible introduction 
of a generalized preference system for the developing countries will 
be dealt with in Chapter 6 of this Annex. 
13. Lastly, by declaring its willingness to accept the CCT as it 
emerges from the Kennedy Round, the United Kingdom appears to 
be prepared to drop its request for nil duties for various products 
which had given rise to difficulties in the previous negotiations. The 
question arises, however, of the pace at which the United Kingdom 
would be prepared to bring its tariff closer to the common customs 
tariff for the products concerned. 
In this respect it should be remembered that the free movement 
of goods within the Community calls for the removal of national 
tariff quotas or their replacement by Community measures. 
14. To sum up, in order that the enlargement of the Community 
should not jeopardize the establishment of the customs union, the 
arrangements involved and in particular the proposed transitional 
period will have to be re-examined once the intentions of the 
countries applying for membership are better known. 
When the exact import to be attached to their acceptance of the 
common customs tariff comes to be examined, it would also be 
advisable to study the situation with regard to certain products 
or particularly important industries where acceptance of the CCT 
cannot assume its full significance unless coupled with acceptance 
of a certain number of basic options in commercial or industrial 
policy. 
(d) Problems connected with commercial policy 
15. The accession negotiations should not delay the endeavour to 
press forward the Community's implementation of a common 
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commercial policy by independent action and under agreements 
negotiated with non-member countries. 
The general approach now being worked out in this connection does 
not seem to raise any major problems for the new members. 1 
CHAPTER II 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
16. With the transitional period drawing to a close, the removal of 
customs duties and the establishment of the common customs tariff 
have enabled certain of the conditions for creating a single market 
to be met. Experience shows, however, that in some sectors these 
measures are far from sufficient to bring about a real development of 
intra-Community trade and the effective use of the economies of 
scale offered by a large market. Moreover, the relatively meagre 
growth of interpenetration at company level is a further brake on 
full exploitation of the opportunities offered by the Community 
market. 
The strengthening of the Community in the field of industrial 
development postulates both an effort to promote the multi-national 
regrouping of enterprises and at the same time an effort to confront 
and concert national objectives to ensure that the influences exerted 
by the public authorities or agencies in the various member countries 
converge and supplement one another effectively. Without such 
efforts it is unlikely that the advantages expected from the creation 
of the single market will be obtained. 
17. These considerations, which help to define the features of an 
economic union conducive to industrial development, have not as yet 
been incorporated in actual Community decisions. General policy 
1 See "Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom Membership of the European 
Communities" (Cmnd. 3301), paras. 38 to 40. 
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lines have nevertheless been laid down by the Council, in particular 
in the second Medium-term Economic Policy Programme, and for 
technology in the Decision of 31 October 1967; these policy lines 
serve as guidelines for work currently in hand in the Community. 
The energy sector raises special problems for the Community in 
view of its dependence on external sources of supply, the importance 
of this point in the traditional activities and the political sensitivity 
of this sector in most of the member countries. The Community is 
preparing to determine general policy lines in the sector. 
(a) Industrial policy 
18. The complete removal of obstacles to trade is one of the 
prerequisites for the Community industries to be able to 
derive more profit from the advantages of a large market. The 
development of these industries can nevertheless be ensured only by 
the creation of a privileged legal, administrative and financial 
framework at European level. 
(i) Establishment of the single market in certain sectors 
19. Experience gained during the transitional period has shown 
that the removal of customs duties and the establishment of the 
common customs tariff not only fell short of what is needed to 
establish a single market in certain industrial sectors but did not 
even lead to a real development of intra-Community trade in the 
industries concerned, which include advanced technology and certain 
other industries that produce capital goods for public or private 
enterprises which provide a public service and are therefore subject 
to State influence. 
The continued division into national markets results not only from 
the influence of Governments on those who use the products of these 
industries, but also from the large part played by the State in 
financing the design and manufacture of the products themselves. 
The implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning public 
contracts cannot without a concerted policy for public orders ensure 
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the effective opening of the market in sectors as important as 
nuclear power, aeronautics, space, computers, conventional heavy 
electrical equipment, communications equipment, railway 
equipment, etc. 
(ii) A statute for companies 
20. There will have to be a common legal framework for the statute 
of companies if industry is not to continue to suffer because the 
diversity of legal systems in the various countries still allows 
disparate conditions of competition and obstacles to the movement 
of production factors across frontiers. Company law should 
be adapted and if necessary supplemented to encourage 
cross-frontier mergers or the founding of companies that operate 
in all the Member States. Steps that could be taken in this 
direction include the introduction of a statute for the "European" 
company, arrangements for the international mergers referred to in 
Article 220 of the EEC Treaty, and the harmonization of company 
law on the protection of interests of members of companies and 
third parties would constitute relevant action. 
Although the British system of company law is in a number of ways 
different from the continental systems (capital does not serve as a 
guarantee in the same way, the structure of management is different, 
and so is the function of the Annual General Meeting), it appears 
that the protection of interests of members and third parties (EEC 
Treaty Article 54(3 g)) is not so different that it could cause serious 
difficulties when Britain joins the Community. 
The present lines under consideration for the "European company" 
provide for the establishment of a new law independent of municipal 
law. For this reason no difficulties are to be feared if further 
countries join the Community. 
The obvious economic advantage of creating a "European company" 
in the enlarged Community justifies the hope that British law will 
not constitute a further obstacle, since the Government of the 
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United Kingdom has declared its readiness to modify its legislation 
to this end. 1 
(iii) Patents 
21. In the field of industrial and commercial protection, there will 
have to be a European law on patents, trade marks and designs. 
Britain and the other candidate countries are already taking part 
with the Member States of the Community and other European 
countries in drafting a Convention on a European system for the 
grant of patents. 
The accession of the candidate countries will make it possible for 
them to participate in a second Convention on the subject, currently 
being drafted in the Community. Its aim is to determine uniformly, 
but for the purposes of the Community alone, the effects of protective 
entitlements granted under the Convention on a European system 
for the grant of patents. 
(iv) The structure of industry 
22. The Commission has already submitted the first proposals for 
the elimination of certain obstacles hampering co-operation and 
concentration of enterprises with their registered offices in the 
Community. These proposals will have to be supplemented to 
remove the obstacles of all kinds which hamper the founding of 
Community multi-national companies. With regard to structural 
adjustments, national policies must be co-ordinated if there is to be 
at least some degree of coherence among them. Britain for its 
part has for two years been making a significant effort to improve 
the structure of its industries and has for this purpose set up the 
Industrial Reorganization Corporation (IRC). The specific aim of 
this organization is to help British industry improve its structure. 
One of its tasks is to accelerate the process of concentration and so 
to improve the productivity and competitivity of British industry. 
Since it was set up, this organization has already a certain number 
1 See "Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom Membership of the European 
Communities" (Cmnd. 3301), paragraph 36: "Considerable amendment of our national law 
might eventually be involved ... " 
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of successes to its credit. The Community will have to make sure 
that Britain and the other candidate countries are ready to take part 
in elaborating a Community policy in this sphere. 
(v) Investments by non-member countries 
23. A significant proportion of American investment finds its way 
to Britain because of the traditional relations existing between 
Britain and the United States. Accession is likely to strengthen 
this trend, making it even more necessary to co-ordinate closely the 
policies of all the States in the enlarged Community on foreign 
investment. 
(vi) The special problems of steel 
The problems raised by the accession of the candidate countries 
mainly concern Britain, whose production in the steel industry is 
slightly under a third of Community production. 
1. Special adaptation problems 
24. In the case of steel, acceptance of the price rules (Article 60 
and implementing provisions) will mean a change in the British 
systems. The procedures for these changes should be settled during 
the negotiations. 
25. In transport, the ECSC Treaty rules serve mainly to ensure 
non-discrimination, a sufficient knowledge of transport rates for the 
application of the provisions in Article 60 (price-lists, calculation of 
prices, alignment), the establishment of international through rates 
and the harmonization of transport conditions. 
In this case, too, the specific procedures by which Britain will 
implement these rules will have to be defined, particularly m 
view of the present organization of transport in Britain. 
In addition, the existence of a sea passage for all transactions 
between Britain and the present Community adds a further 
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dimension to the current difficulties of applying the rules governing 
the transport and the prices of products. 
Particular attention should therefore be paid to knowledge of 
maritime freight rates and also to their publication, a point which 
raises serious technical difficulties. 
2. The functioning of the Common Market in an enlarged Community 
26. Apart from questions of scale, the effects which integration of 
the British steel industry will have on the functioning of the Common 
Market present the following features: 
In steel, the implementing provisions of the 1967 Iron and Steel Act 
will gradually centralize the entire responsibility for steel in the 
British Steel Corporation (BSC) which will moreover be acting under 
the Ministry of Power. Only a small fraction of steel production 
remains in private hands. 
The system of ownership in the industry will not be affected (ECSC 
Treaty Article 83). However, the economic importance of the steel 
industry in the United Kingdom and the differences between the 
internal structure of the steel companies and that of companies in 
the corresponding industry in the ECSC might well raise problems 
of balance in the matter of competition. 
27. Independently of the specific problems which may be raised by 
the size, internal structure and functioning of Britain's nationalized 
enterprises, it should be remembered that Articles 66 and 67 of the 
Treaty of Paris contain provisions which could prevent the dominant 
position of a public or private enterprise in the Common Market 
from being used for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Treaty. 
28. To sum up, it appears that the problems to be solved in steel 
are mainly a matter of elaborating measures under which a few very 
large undertakings could be integrated into the common market in 
an orderly fashion. 
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(b) Research and Technology Policy 
(i) Recent trend 
29. The trend in science and technology since September 1967 
shows three main changes, two of which are satisfactory whereas the 
third is a source of concern. 
First, the Community institutions have had occasion to clarify their 
attitude on certain desirable lines of technological development in 
Europe and have already taken several decisions. Thus, in the 
Resolution of 31 October 1967, the Council, the Representatives of 
the Member States and the Commission expressed their resolve to 
launch a vigorous policy to revitalize and promote scientific and 
technological research and industrial innovation. They likewise 
decided to carry on with various activities calculated to improve 
and harmonize the general conditions that foster research and 
innovation and to explore the scope for co-operation in new areas. 
The work stemming from this decision is in progress and should 
enable the Council to take further decisions very soon. 
Secondly, the Community countries have made very definite 
advances as regards stepping up their research efforts. In spite 
of the lack of recent statistical data, it really looks as though the 
gap between the United Kingdom and the Community countries, 
as shown by the 1963 figures, is tending to shrink appreciably. 
30. Against this, the past two years have been particularly difficult 
for Community action and international co-operation. In both the 
nuclear and the space fields, the Community countries have been 
incapable, either as a group of six or in a wider framework, of 
agreeing on programmes of any considerable size likely to lead 
in the medium term to industrial applications. 
31. It must be added that the surveys and discussions of the last 
two or three years have aroused a far clearer awareness of the need 
for international co-operation. 
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Naturally this is by no means the panacea for all the problems 
involved; it would be foolish to suppose that the pooling of national 
resources and expenditure would automatically bring about a 
commensurate improvement in technological progress. The 
contributions by the various States in money and manpower 
would only be really meaningful to the extent that the Community 
countries succeeded in defining and carrying out a common 
technology policy. Yet it is only through such co-operation that 
Europe will be able to improve its competitive power versus the 
United States and Japan by strengthening the technological 
foundations of its enterprises. 
32. The chief technological development problems are encountered 
at all levels-the State, the Community and, after other countries 
join, the enlarged Community. One need only recall the piecemeal 
efforts, the precariousness of commitments, the question of outlets, 
the inadequate links between firms and research projects, and so on. 
The entry of the United Kingdom would not alter the nature of the 
problems or of the obstacles to their solution. On the other hand, 
it would considerably alter the Community's scope for action. 
The enlarged Community would by its very size afford a still better 
framework for the implementation of a Community research and 
development policy of international range and would make it 
easier to co-ordinate the attitudes of the countries represented in the 
various international agencies or organizations where the Six and the 
applicant countries are preponderant. It is therefore in the light of 
the greater chances of co-ordinated action in an enlarged Community 
that the quantitative contribution in human and material resources 
which the United Kingdom can bring to the Community's overall 
potential should be appraised. 
33. The proposals prepared by the Working Group on Scientific and 
Technical Research Policy concerning certain specific fields, which 
are now under discussion at the Council, are a first step on the road 
to new co-operative projects. An agreement on these proposals 
would be of major importance from both the political angle (by 
manifesting the Governments' intention to work together) and the 
technical angle (by opening up the way for new experiments in 
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methods of organizing such co-operation). An agreement of this 
kind should be sought as quickly as possible, particularly as it is 
likely to concern non-member countries, and should not be delayed 
by the procedures involved in negotiations on admission to 
membership. 
(ii) New prospects in an enlarged Community 
34. The development of effective co-operation in the Community 
presupposes: 
(1) That the duplication of programmes and projects will be 
gradually cut back by systematic confrontation of the various 
countries' programmes and budgets; next, that the scientific 
programmes will be dovetailed and the technological tasks shared 
out; the dovetailing process must cover activities carried out both 
in the member countries and in international agencies; 
(2) That scientific and industrial projects will be launched 
simultaneously in sufficient number to achieve an optimum 
Community ratio between the contributions and interests of the 
various countries taking part; 
(3) That firms or groups of firms will be associated in the preparation, 
implementation and further development of the various countries' 
and the Community's technological programmes; 
(4) That the conditions under which, in different countries, the 
State collaborates with industry in research and technology (State-
aided contract machinery, association of State and industry, etc.) 
will be harmonized; 
(5) That bilateral scientific and technological agreements concluded 
between States will be compatible with the Community's interests; 
(6) That scientific and technical personnel will be trained or retrained 
to give them greater mobility within the Community. 
The accession of the applicant countries, and more especially of the 
United Kingdom, will give a new perspective to the problems of 
science and technology which have to be studied in the light of work 
planned or under way in the Community. 
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35. The first aim of the negotiations with the applicant countries 
should therefore be to obtain agreement-with due regard to what 
has already been achieved in the Community-on the implementing 
of a common policy for technological research and development, 
with as its main plank the pooling of resources in brainpower and 
money within the context of determining objectives and programmes 
decided upon jointly. 
(iii) Specific nuclear research problems 
a) United Kingdom 
36. Since the second world war the United Kingdom's drive to 
develop its nuclear potential has been sustained and vigorous. 
Its basic heavy equipment-an isotope separation plant, 31 research 
reactors, 29 power reactors with an installed capacity of 5 353 MWe 
at the end of 1969 (as against 21 power reactors with an installed 
capacity of 3 191 MWe in the Community) and its reprocessing 
plants-give the UK a power which is still as great as that of the 
entire Community. The important work in progress on breeder 
reactors deserves special mention. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom has at its disposal a real surplus 
of scientists and engineers who have specialized in nuclear work, 
particularly since the staff cuts carried out in the United Kingdom 
Atomic Energy Authority (31 653 employees in 1968 as against 
40 000 in 1961). For a long time, however, British scientists and 
engineers had been playing a leading part in the nuclear development 
of a number of other countries. 
The UKAEA has considered it advisable to adopt a plan for the 
gradual and partial redirection of its atomic personnel towards 
non-nuclear research; it also has to face another problem, that of the 
relatively high average age of its scientific and technical personnel. 
37. Now that the Community is reviewing its nuclear policy, certain 
questions arise concemmg possible participation by the United 
Kingdom. 
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In the first place, it should be pointed out that the Euratom Treaty 
contains no clause binding any member country to make available 
to the others the knowledge it possesses at the time of its joining 
the Community; only knowledge acquired subsequently has to be 
pooled. The United Kingdom could therefore in theory sign the 
Treaty as it stands and give no information whatsoever to its new 
partners. However, an issue arises which was already broached in 
the earlier negotiations: on joining the EAEC the United Kingdom 
would have access not only to the Community's installations and 
knowhow, but to those of the individual member countries, made 
available to the Community through contracts of participation and 
association (the national share in which is more than 60%).- It 
would thus be no more than fair if the United Kingdom were to 
make some contribution; the nature, as well as the manner in which it 
should be made, would have to be negotiated. 
United Kingdom participation in the Community's future research 
and development programme (due to take effect as from 1 January 
1970), obviously depends on the general nature of that programme. 
It must be borne in mind that the Community has decided to 
continue participating until at least 31 March 1973 in the Dragon 
project, an international project based in England which is an 
example of successful technical co-operation between the Community 
the United Kingdom and the other member countries of the 
European Nuclear Energy Agency. 
b) Other countries 
38. Norway has a limited nuclear potential, compnsmg four 
research reactors, and notably the Halden reactor, in the operation 
of which certain Community countries participate. Norway is 
likewise linked to the IAEA by various agreements and the bilateral 
Norway-United States agreement has been transferred to the IAEA 
for the implementation of safeguards and controls. 
39. Denmark has a highly-reputed institute of theoretical physics 
and a nuclear centre at Riso equipped with three research reactors. 
The bilateral Denmark-UK agreement and the Denmark-USA 
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agreement have likewise been transferred to the IAEA for the 
implementation of safeguards and controls. 
40. Ireland has no atomic plant. 
41. The conclusion prompted by this brief review of the problems 
arising in this sector from enlargement of the Community is that the 
admission of the United Kingdom would: 
(1) Strengthen the enlarged Community's scientific nuclear 
potential; 
(2) Alter the conditions of both the internal and the external nuclear 
market, because of the essentially private nature of the British 
industry; 
(3) Strengthen the Community's competitive position on the world 
market through association of British firms with continental firms; 
(4) Be an important factor in the development of general, other than 
nuclear, research. 
It is clear that for an enlarged Community, the United Kingdom's 
experience in the field of isotope separation, by the gaseous diffusion 
and the centrifuging processes, would constitute not only a technical 
and economic but also a political advantage. 
(c) Energy policy 
42. As regards energy, the United Kingdom and the Community 
are in a fairly similar situation in many respects. Furthermore, one 
of the essential features of that situation, namely the pronounced 
and growing dependence on external supply sources, is shared with 
the other applicant countries. 
The similarity of the current situations and of the lines along which 
they are developing gives rise to policies that are relatively 
comparable in their principles and their general pattern. In 
particular, it will be observed that the guidelines for the British 
energy policy are fundamentally no different from those proposed 
by the Commission. 
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If adjustments are made on individual points, the negotiations 
concerning entry should not run into insuperable obstacles in the 
energy field. 
43. In preparing its "First Guidelines for a Community Energy 
Policy", submitted to the Council on 18 December 1968, the 
Commission took as its basis the work accomplished by the three 
former Executives. 
The results of that work were the Protocol of Agreement on energy 
problems concluded by the Governments of the Member States on 
21 Apri11964 and the Council's decision of 10 July 1967 taking note 
of the tabling of the Commission's first memorandum on the 
Community's policy concerning oil and natural gas. 
The United Kingdom Government, for its part, last defined its 
energy policy in the "Fuel Policy" White Paper of November 1967. 
(i) Summary comparison of the energy economies 
44. The energy supply and demand situation in the Community and 
in the United Kingdom calls for a few very general comments. 
The United Kingdom's overall energy requirements are constantly 
rising, but more slowly than the Community's-1.5% a year as 
against 4. 7% during the last ten years. But the British 
consumption figure is still distinctly higher than the Community 
average, the gap being about 50% at the present time. 
In the Community, domestic production covers 39% of requirements 
as against 53% in the United Kingdom. On both sides the balance 
is made up almost entirely of imported oil. Unlike the United 
Kingdom, however, the Community imports more in the form of 
petroleum and considerably less in the form of refined products, 
as well as exporting more of them. 
Most of the United Kingdom's domestic production consists of 
coal (90%). Natural gas still occupies only a minimal position, but 
its use is expanding more rapidly than in the Community. Nuclear 
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energy, for its part, already accounts for an appreciable fraction of 
domestic production (6.5%). 
The Community, on the other hand, has a wide variety of domestic 
resources, coal accounting for only 55% of the total. Lignite, oil, 
hydroelectric energy-negligible in the UK-and natural gas make 
up the remainder, nuclear energy still playing only a very modest 
part. 
Both sides, however, place a great deal of confidence in this new 
energy form as a means of offsetting the shortfall in native fossil fuel 
resources. 
45. It must be noted that, of the other countries seeking admission, 
Norway has abundant water power resources which cover nearly 
two thirds of its total energy consumption. Ireland and Denmark, 
on the other hand, lack resources of their own. 
(ii) The energy policy's general objectives and framework of action 
46. The objectives proposed for a common energy policy in the light 
of that sector's specific features are set out in the 1964 Protocol. 
They include the equalizing of the conditions of competition between 
the different energy sources and in relation to enterprises outside the 
Community, and the protection of consumers' interests. 
47. The framework of action outlined in the First Guidelines for a 
Community Energy Policy is designed to create the requisite 
conditions for medium-term estimates and planning, longer-term 
forecasts and, when necessary, intervention measures in the event 
of supply difficulties. These various categories of measures do not 
represent new departures, as some of them have already been in 
operation in certain sectors for a number of years. Their general 
application should not cause difficulties in the negotiations on 
admission, especially if it is remembered that, by reason of the fact 
that its energy industries are under public ownership, the United 
Kingdom has facilities that do not exist in all the Community 
countries. 
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In regard to the measures aimed at ensuring security of supply, their 
Community-wide character was confirmed by the setting up of the 
ad hoc Committee on Security of Supply, established by the ECSC 
Council's decision of 3 May 1966. Hence the countries seeking 
admission would have to concur in this scheme. 
(iii) Establishing the common energy market 
48. The setting up of a common market in the energy sector implies 
the implementation of measures already laid down by the Treaties 
with regard to the free movement of goods and freedom of 
establishment. 
As regards the rules of competition more particularly, this will 
mean ensuring access, without discrimination, to the supply sources, 
determining a specific notification procedure for firms' merger 
projects in the oil, natural gas and nuclear fuel sectors, and taking 
measures whereby a posteriori information will be provided on 
prices actually obtaining on the market for the various forms of 
energy. The adoption of the measures referred to above would 
entail deviation from the provisions of the Treaties. It will likewise 
be necessary to discuss with the Member States the expediency of 
harmonizing their arrangements concerning price policy and of 
ensuring a high degree of transparency in the energy market 
conditions. 
49. For coal, Article 60(2) of the ECSC Treaty and the decisions 
stemming therefrom contain provisions concerning the publication of 
price lists and conditions of sale. Acceptance of the ECSC Treaty 
provisions in this field will necessitate changes in the British system, 
which in part uses delivered prices, and in certain cases area prices, 
but has no generally published prices. The same applies to carriage 
rates. 
50. As to indirect taxation, the aim should be to attain harmonized 
application of the tax on value added, harmonization of the specific 
energy-consumption taxes, and harmonization of the specific taxes 
on petroleum products. 
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51. A common energy policy should comprise: 
(1) A Community-level supply programme, more especially for 
hydrocarbons and nuclear fuel; 
(2) Supervision and guidance of capital investments in the energy 
sector; 
(3) Reorganization of the energy industries. 
52. As regards the commercial policy on energy, hydrocarbons and 
nuclear fuel, the United Kingdom's entry might occasion certain 
difficulties, particularly in the hydrocarbons sector, because that 
country is linked, by special agreements, with certain crude oil 
producing or mainly refining countries. 
In the case of coal, the proposed co-ordination of the national import 
programmes might present some difficulties for the applicant 
countries, notably the United Kingdom, which reserves its own 
market for home-produced coal. 
53. The provisions concerning the notification of investment 
projects in the coal and nuclear industries should be extended to 
the other forms of energy. The extension of this procedure should 
not give rise to any particular difficulties, bearing in mind the 
structure of the energy industries in the United Kingdom. 
54. The operation of aid systems for coal was already provided for 
by the 1964 Protocol and was implemented by Decisions Nos. 3/65 
and 1/67. At first sight, and subject to adjustments on particular 
points, it does not appear that in this field there should be any great 
difficulty in arriving at a common standpoint with the United 
Kingdom, whose concerns are on the whole much the same as those 
of the Community. 
As to hydrocarbons, the remedy for the disparity in conditions of 
competition between the Community enterprises and the big 
international companies would be to apply fiscal measures and 
to stimulate the search for and exploitation of crude petroleum 
by Community firms. 
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Generally speaking, British oil companies are already, by 
comparison with oil companies in other non-member countries, 
in a less favourable position than the Community's enterprises, 
especially as regards the fiscal handicap. 
Regarding nuclear fuels, the basic requirement of an energy policy 
consists in possessing or at least having reasonably guaranteed 
access to resources. In this respect, the United Kingdom has: 
(1) Financial interests in natural uranium production in Canada, 
South Africa and Australia; 
(2) A gaseous diffusion plant for enriching uranium, at Capenhurst, 
which is being enlarged at the present time and will probably further 
increase its capacity by use of the centrifuging system. 
Assuming negotiations start in the near future, the Community 
countries' access to these resources could be arranged at the time of 
revising Chapter VI of the Euratom Treaty. 1 As far as isotope 
separation is concerned, the question of other Community countries' 
participation in the Anglo-German-Dutch project must be studied 
from the angle of the industrial problems it raises. 
(d) Safeguards and controls 
55. In the nuclear field, it should be pointed out that the 
interpretation of the EAEC Treaty provisions on the Euratom 
safeguards and controls, as applicable to British military 
installations, came under discussion during the 1962 negotiations. 
There is an arrangement between the Community and the French 
Government on this point which might constitute a useful precedent. 
Acceptance by the British Government of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency inspection of certain British installations or imports 
raises problems similar to those raised by the negotiations on the 
Non-proliferation Treaty. These problems do not appear to be 
insuperable. 
1 Provided for in Article 76 of the Euratom Treaty. 
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CHAPTER III 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
(a) Quantitative and qualitative changes in the basic data 
concerning agriculture in an enlarged Community 
56. Compared with the natural and structural production potential 
of agriculture in the present Member States, that of the four 
applicant countries is relatively small. 
Agricultural area would be about 30% greater in a ten-member 
Community than in the Six. Since the average farm holding in 
Britain and Denmark is larger than in the Six, the number of holdings 
(with one hectare or more of agricultural area) would increase only 
by some 20%. The increase in numbers employed in agriculture 
would be even less (16%). 
Farms, more especially in Denmark but in the United Kingdom and 
Ireland too, are run on relatively rational lines and noted for high 
productivity. This comes out also in the figures for the value of 
production and value added by agriculture in these countries: 
whereas the value of production in the "Four" is 23% of that 
of the Six, the value added per person employed in agriculture 
in the Four (3 000 u.a.) is more than 900 u.a. higher than in 
the Six (2 075 u.a.). 
Consequently, agriculture's contribution to the aggregate national 
product of the Four (nearly 4.6%) is relatively high when compared 
with the proportion of farm labour in the total labour force (5.9%), 
while in the Six its contribution (7.7%) ismuchlowerwhencompared 
with the percentage of the labour force employed (15%). 
57. As for the supply of farm products, the situation of the Six 
will not be appreciably altered by the accession of the Four, if one 
may judge from the supply situation in 1967/68.1 
1 See table annexed to this chapter (p. 80). 
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Whereas self-sufficiency in the Six averages nearly 90%, the figure 
for the Ten would be around 85%. This slight difference arises 
from the fact that in the Four there are two small countries with 
agricultural surpluses (Denmark and Ireland) and one large 
importing country (United Kingdom). 
58. The biggest changes in self-sufficiency in individual products 
(on the basis of 1967 f68 figures) would be as follows: 
Six Ten 
Decreases % % 
Wheat 112.5 97.6 
Rice 100.8 85.9 
Sugar 104.6 83.0 
Fruit 89.9 81.6 
Vegetables 102.5 98.9 
Mutton and lamb and meat of goats and kids 84.2 58.9 
Butter 111.1 1 91.81 
Cheese 102.71 99.91 
Oils and fats 41.8 40.1 
Increases 
Feed grain 78.6 79.6 
Beef and veal 88.8 97.6 
Poultrymeat 97.8 100.0 
Pigmeat 100.0 103.9 
It is mainly in cereal-based livestock products, then, that self-
sufficiency in the Ten would be higher. 
The first figures available for 1968/69 indicate that for the Six and 
the Four alike self-sufficiency in most products is likely to increase 
further and along more or less the same lines. 
1 Provisional figures. 
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The degrees of self-sufficiency may in future undergo certain changes 
to the extent that implementation of the common agricultural policy 
has repercussions on the volume of production in the enlarged 
Community. 
59. In the matter of prices and price ratios at producer level, the 
prices ruling in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark are 
fairly low compared with the single prices applied in the Six-leaving 
aside the basically different support system for British farming. 
Norway, on the other hand, has relatively high producer prices. 
Producer price ratios in the Four are also different from those found 
in the Six. 
60. The following conclusions may be drawn from this analysis of 
changes in the basic data: 
(i) Those rules (especially those relating to market organization, 
price policy and financing) which are largely determined by the 
supply situation will not come up against a fundamentally changed 
situation once the Community has been enlarged, even if some 
adjustment might be advisable for a few products. 
(ii) Adoption of the common agricultural policy and the price ratios 
now fixed for the Six could lead to changes in the pattern of 
production in the new member countries because of their different 
price ratios. Assessment of the possible consequences of any such 
changes could be profitably attempted only in co-operation with 
the countries concerned. 
(b) Special problems of candidate countries 
61. Application of the common agricultural policy, as worked out 
by the Community, to countries whose agricultural policies have 
been different in many respects may confront these countries 
with certain specific problems, quite apart from the financial 
question. 
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(1) United Kingdom 
62. A comparison of farm prices in the EEC and producer prices in 
the United Kingdom shows that prices are sometimes higher, 
sometimes lower, and that for certain products these differences are 
considerable. 
Since the United Kingdom will have to fall in line with the generally 
higher Community prices and different price pattern there will, as 
pointed out above, be problems of adjustment. 
Moreover, the United Kingdom has guaranteed prices for some 
products for which no guarantees are given under the common 
agricultural policy (eggs, mutton and lamb, potatoes, wool). 
63. The application of the EEC price level and price system for 
farm products (involving abandonment of the deficiency payments 
system, the application of levies to products imported from non-
member countries and payment for goods imported from the EEC 
at the internal market price) is bound to mean higher consumer 
prices for a number of important foods. There is unlikely to be 
any serious price change for other foods, notably drinking milk, 
fruit, vegetables and mutton and lamb, and there may even be a 
drop in price for some others (eggs and potatoes). 
Various inquiries into this question show that, generally speaking, 
the increase in the cost of living can be put at about 3.5%. 
64. The British farmer seems to attach great importance to the 
annual price review, which is based on an analysis of the agricultural 
situation made by the Government m consultation with 
representatives of farming interests. 
Apart from certain differences between the methods of compiling 
data on the agricultural situation in the United Kingdom and the 
Community, there are important differences in the consultation 
procedure prior to the annual price fixing: 
(i) In the United Kingdom consultation with the farming 
organizations is official; in the Community contacts are purely 
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informal. The Community procedure, on the other hand, includes 
reference to the European Parliament of price proposals submitted 
by the Commission to the Council; 
(ii) In the United Kingdom the object of the exercise is to determine 
guaranteed producer prices, generally ensured by means of 
deficiency payments, so that market prices are not affected, 
while the Community fixes target prices for the market, directly 
affecting the economy in general. For this reason, any official 
consultation of interested sections of the community could not 
be restricted to farming organizations. 
65. With regard to relations between the United Kingdom and 
Commonwealth countries in the agricultural sector, two problems 
seem to warrant special attention-the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement and, more important, New Zealand butter. 
66. The United Kingdom is bound by its obligations under the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement to buy a specified amount of sugar 
at a negotiated price. The current commitment is for approximately 
1.8 million tons and the price is nearly 119 u.a. per ton of raw sugar 
-almost 50% above the current world price. In addition to this 
quantity at a negotiated price, the British market absorbs a further 
0.4 million tons of Commonwealth sugar at the world price. This 
sugar enters the United Kingdom at a preferential rate of duty. 
Commonwealth imports cover more than two thirds of the United 
Kingdom's sugar requirements. The output of beet sugar, which 
is strictly controlled through a system of production licences, is 
approximately 0.9 million tons. 
A point to be mentioned here is that there is already a sugar surplus 
in the Six. In an attempt to keep this surplus below 600 000 tons 
in a year with a normal harvest (this includes the French overseas 
departments), the Commission has put forward various proposals, 
one of which was to readjust the basic quotas. The main object of 
the measures proposed is to link the sum of the basic quotas to total 
foreseeable human consumption of white sugar in the Community by 
means of an annual review (until 1974) of the right to utilize the 
existing basic quotas. 
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The term of validity of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (it 
expires at the end of 1974) roughly coincides with the period during 
which the common organization of sugar markets still provides that 
quotas limiting price and marketing guarantees be allocated among 
the several Member States. Community arrangements for the 
final period will thus come into force after the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement expires. 
67. The British market is virtually the only outlet for butter from 
New Zealand, approximately 85% of whose butter exports go to the 
United Kingdom. The trade agreement now in force expires on 
30 September 1972 and stipulates that the minimum tonnage of 
New Zealand butter to be imported under quota arrangements is 
170 000 tons. This tonnage covers more than one third of the 
United Kingdom's total requirements, which amount to 
approximately 470 000 tons. Because butter production increased 
to an estimated 65 000 tons in 1969-70-the normal average had been 
30 000 tons-total United Kingdom imports have been cut from 
440 000 to 400 000 tons. Three Community countries (France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands) have quotas totalling 11 800 tons. 
Norway, Ireland and Denmark have been authorized to supply 
120 000 tons and quotas for other countries total about 95 000 tons 
(Australia accounting for 65 100 tons). 
The present Community has structural surpluses now running at 
400 000 tons, and there is a tendency for them to increase. 
The butter problem is complicated by the fact that the extension of 
the common agricultural policy to the United Kingdom will mean 
higher prices for the British consumer and possibly an increase in 
home production of butter. 
(2) Ireland 
68. Agriculture holds a very special place in the Irish economy. 
It employs almost 30% of the labour force and accounts for 20% of 
the GNP. 
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Agricultural exports represent approximately 50% of total exports. 
The United Kingdom is the largest single importer of Irish farm 
products, but considerable quantities are also exported to the 
Community and to the United States. 
As far as agricultural structures are concerned, approximately 50% 
of farms in the country as a whole are of 12 ha and over. In the 
north and west, however, the percentage is not so high and here 
structural adaptation problems are complicated by limited non-
agricultural resources. 
69. For most products the alignment of Irish producer prices on 
Community prices would result in increases of varying extent in 
both producer and consumer prices. A slight drop, however, can 
be expected in sugar beet, potato and egg prices. 
(3) Denmark 
70. Denmark has one of the most advanced and productive 
agricultural economies in the world. 
Agriculture gives employment to approximately 9% of the labour 
force and accounts for somewhat less than 10% of the GNP. Almost 
two thirds of Danish farm production is exported. 
71. Generally speaking, Danish farm prices are considerably lower 
than those applied within the EEC (1967/68). The alignment of 
Danish prices on EEC prices would bring considerable additional 
earnings to Danish agriculture, even allowing for an increase in 
feed-grain prices and the suppression of certain subsidies. 
The application of the common agricultural policy would also lead 
to an increase in consumer prices. 
(4) Norway 
72. In Norway the fishing industry and forestry are of importance 
as well as farming (contribution to GNP: farming 4%, forestry 1.6%, 
fisheries 1.9%). Norwegian agriculture is carried on under 
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particularly unfavourable natural and structural conditions (the 
area of the average farm is 5 ha); it could not survive in the northern 
part of the country without substantial support from the State. 
In its efforts to maintain a minimum of population in these areas, 
Norway has not as yet been able to dispense with aid of this kind. 
Livestock products are the major item in agricultural production 
(two thirds of total income, 40% of which is accounted for by 
milk products). 
73. The alignment of Norwegian producer prices on Community 
prices could lead to a reduction in the earnings of Norwegian 
agriculture. 
74. However, the lowering of producer prices would not mean a 
reduction in consumers' expenditure. On the contrary, the removal 
of consumer subsidies and the rise in prices for imported goods 
would lead to a certain increase in consumer prices. 
(c) Financial problems 
75. As far as the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF is concerned, 
the enlargement of the Community will lead to increased 
expenditure on refunds on exports to non-member countries, 
intervention on the internal market, and direct aid to agricultural 
production in the new member countries. Expenditure will increase 
despite savings on refunds now payable on exports from the Six to 
the future member countries and on intervention expenditure now 
necessary on the internal market of the Six for products which will 
find a partial outlet on the markets of the future member countries. 
For the Guidance Section of the EAGGF too, enlargement will mean 
higher expenditure because of the increase in activity. 
Subject to all the reservations required in such calculations, a 
preliminary estimate of the order of magnitude of the sums which the 
EAGGF will have to administer in 1973 gives the following figures: 
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Estimate for 1973 (million u.a.) 
Expenditure EAGGF SIX TEN 
I1 I 
112 I 
Guarantee Section 3 000 2 100 3 400 
Guidance Section 285 1 500 (350) 
Total 3 285 3 600 (3 750) 
1 Without implementation of the structures memorandum. 
2 With implementation of the structures memorandum. 
I II 
2 500 
(1 700) 
(4 200) 
Difference between 
SIX and TEN 
I I II 
+ 400 + 400 
+ (65) +(200) 
+(465) +(600) 
In this study 1973 is taken as the year when, hypothetically, 
definitive arrangements for Community financing of all farm 
products for which single markets now exist would be in operation 
not only for the Six but also for the Ten. Estimates are based on 
hypothetical quantities and hypothetical levels of expenditure. 
For most products, quantities have been calculated on the basis of 
production and trade trends over the last ten years, projected to 
1973. For the principal products allowance is also made for the 
most important changes likely to occur in the pattern of production, 
food consumption and trade as a result of the extension of the present 
common agricultural policy to the applicant countries. 
Forecasts for the level of expenditure have been based on the 
Commission's price proposals for 1970/71 and current world prices. 
76. Given the assumption that definitive arrangements for 
Community financing of farm expenditure will have been introduced 
by 1973, it should be noted that the Commission's proposals on 
this matter are that, from 1 January 1971, 
(i) receipts from agricultural levies and charges will be included in the 
Community's budget; 
(ii) financial contributions from the Member States will be gradually 
replaced by the Community's own revenue. 
The problem of financing EAGGF expenditure should be seen, then, 
in the general context of the Community budget. 
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GO 
0 Self-sufficiency in principal farm and food products 
in the Six and in the Ten (EEC + United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland and Norway) 
SIX TEN 
1962/63 1962/63 
1963/64 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1963/64 1964/65 1965/66 (1) (1) 
Wheat 99.5 105.7 110.0 96.0 112.5 86.7 91.3 93.7 
Feed grain 77.1 74.6 70.9 72.0 78.6 76.1 75.3 75.3 
Total cereals (excl. rice) 86.3 87.2 86.4 81.2 91.1 80.2 81.3 80.9 
Rice (husked) 79.0 79.0 59.9 79.8 100.8 68.1 68.3 51.6 
White sugar 98.7 119.7 104.1 98.7 104.6 75.5 92.5 80.2 
Vegetables 102.4 102.0 101.6 103.0 102.5 98.6 98.7 98.0 
Fruit (excl. citrus) 91.3 90.8 87.8 89.4 89.9 83.6 82.8 79.8 
Citrus 43.9 47.6 46.5 50.6 NA 37.1 41.0 39.8 
Beef and veal 90.3 86.4 84.4 86.8 88.8 94.4 91.6 90.2 
Pigmeat8 99.2 100.6 97.8 97.7 100.0 102.3 104.8 103.0 
Poultrymeat 91.4 94.0 95.0 97.6 97.8 97.3 98.1 98.5 
Mutton and lamb and meat of goats 
and kids 92.3 88.9 86.5 83.8 84.2 61.5 60.5 60.1 
Eggs 94.4 95.5 NA 96.8 97.1 97.5 98.0 NA 
Cheese 98.0 98.4 98.5 101.2 102.78 95.8 96.5 96.4 
Butter 99.5 102.0 101.7 108.8 111.18 82.8 84.7 84.4 
Oils and fats 38.5 37.2 36.8 36.3 41.8 34.6 33.6 32.9 
I 
~ 1 Average. 
B Including bacon. 
';' a Provisional figures. 
NA =Not available. 
Sources: For the Six: SOEC - For the Ten: OECD. 
(%) 
1966/67 1967/68 
83.7 97.6 
74.8 79.6 
78.0 85.8 
68.6 85.9 
78.1 83.0 
99.0 98.9 
81.2 81.6 
43.5 NA 
94.2 97.6 
102.6 103.9 
99.8 100.0 
61.5 58.9 
98.5 98.5 
99.3 99.ga 
87.4 91.83 
35.5 40.1 
CHAPTER IV 
OTHER PROBLEMS 
RELATING TO ECONOMIC UNION 
77. The enlargement of the Community raises other problems 
arising either from the risk that competition may be distorted by the 
special situation of the new members or from the need to ensure 
that the new economic area of the Community is endowed with a 
satisfactory organization. 
How important the achievement of economic union is for the 
development of the Community at the present juncture can be 
appreciated from the following examples. 
(a) Liberalization of capital movements 
78. The establishment of an economic union calls for the gradual 
introduction of arrangements under which capital has a high degree 
of freedom to move between the countries in the union. 
Under the two directives adopted by the Council pursuant to 
Article 67 of the EEC Treaty, the normal arrangement within 
the Community is complete freedom from exchange controls for 
various types of capital movement-particularly those connected 
with direct investments, transactions in securities listed on stock 
exchanges, export credits and "personal" transfers. 
Since the war the United Kingdom has consistently maintained 
restrictions on capital movements to and from countries outside the 
sterling area. In October 1964 these restrictions were tightened up. 
The British authorities have also introduced new arrangements 
restricting freedom of capital movements within the sterling area. 
To meet commitments arising from the Treaty and from directives 
adopted by the Council, the new members will have to amend their 
current rules and regulations. In the case of the United Kingdom, 
this question should be tackled as part of a general study of the 
country's economic, financial and monetary situation. 
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(b) Harmonization of taxes 
79. The establishment of a common market comparable with a 
domestic market calls for considerable tax harmonization. The 
new members would have to accept not only the directives already 
adopted concerning turnover taxes but also current commitments to 
adopt further directives in this field. It would be advisable to 
ascertain during the negotiations whether the new members are 
prepared to join the present members in their efforts to achieve 
harmonization in other areas of taxation such as excise duties and 
the tax arrangements applying to capital movements, mergers and 
corporate profits, with an eye to elimination of tax frontiers and 
frontier controls inside the Community. 
(c) Restrictive agreements and dominant positions 
80. The entry of the United Kingdom and other applicant countries 
can be expected to strengthen competition. The enlargement of 
the Community, then, ought to diminish the importance and 
effectiveness of restrictive agreements and dominant positions. 
Enlargement could offer the advantage of making it possible to 
increase the scale of firms while maintaining workable competition. 
Since the new members would have no difficulty in accepting the 
objectives or implementing procedures of Community policy in 
this field, the only problems which seem to arise are transitional 
(e.g. the time-limit for notification of agreements). 
(d) Technical obstacles to trade: industrial standards 
81. Owing to the divergences between British standards-or those 
of certain other applicants-and the standards now applied in the 
Member States, one of the effects of enlargement would be an 
appreciable increase in the significance of technical obstacles to 
intra-Community trade. It may well be, however, that a bigger 
market would constitute an incentive to overcome the difficulties 
encountered so far, given the interest that the United Kingdom 
has shown in this field. 
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Moreover, the British should not lose sight of the advantages of 
adopting the decimal system in the United Kingdom. 
(e) Regional policy 
82. The accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and 
Norway to the Community should not, it seems, call for any changes 
in the European Community's regional objectives. 
Regional policies and regional problems in the prospective member 
countries are not basically different from those in the present 
Community countries. 
The applicants' regional policies are like those of the Member States 
in having the same objective-more balanced distribution of 
development-and similar incentives to guide the siting of new 
industry. 
Norway's regional problem is the income gap between the more 
developed regions and the outlying regions, particularly in the 
north, where special assistance has been granted to agriculture. 
In the United Kingdom industry is concentrating heavily in certain 
regions, particularly in the south around London, while other 
regions are inadequately developed or are suffering from the decline 
of their traditional industries. The United Kingdom, moreover, has 
long experience of regional policy. 
Ireland has embarked upon a policy of industrialization. The aim 
is to stimulate the economic development of the whole country 
rather than redress the differences in economic development between 
the various regions. Gross national product per head is 
approximately the same in Ireland as in Italy, but the differences 
between regions are less wide. 
In the six-member Community it has been found that economic 
union with its common policies and even the common market with 
its threefold freedom of movement for workers, goods and capital 
could not be established and would not confer the expected benefits 
unless regional economic structures were resolutely harmonized. 
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This should provide an additional incentive, once the process of 
enlarging the Community begins, to pay particular attention to the 
need for very active promotion and co-ordination of regional 
policies at Community level. 
(f) Financin~ of social security 
83. Approximately half the United Kingdom's social security 
expenditure is paid for by the Exchequer and half by flat-rate 
contributions from employers and employees. In the Six, at least 
three quarters of the money required is financed out of wage-related 
contributions from workers and employers, the balance coming 
from public funds. The British system may favour British firms, 
especially in industries where wages represent a large share of 
value added, unless this advantage is outweighed by the heavier 
burden of taxation. 
This conclusion is, however, based on mere theory. Although the 
conditions are in fact such that 'specific distortions can occur, it still 
remains to be seen, industry by industry, whether the distortions are 
serious enough to require elimination (Article 101 of the EEC 
Treaty). 
The same problem will have to be studied m respect of the 
Scandinavian countries also. 
(g) Nordic labour market 
84. The existence of a unified labour market among the 
Scandinavian countries will make it necessary to check how far 
Community priority in access to employment would be affected by 
the de jure and de facto situation in Scandinavia. Difficulties 
might arise if, say, one or other of the Nordic countries remained 
outside the enlarged Community or if no specific agreements on 
the point were made with those Scandinavian countries which 
did not become members. 
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(h) Commonwealth Immigration Act 
85. The Commonwealth Immigration Act regulates access to 
employment and establishment in the United Kingdom for citizens 
of Commonwealth countries. It is based on the principle of United 
Kingdom law whereby citizens both of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies and of Commonwealth countries rank as "British subjects"; 
one application of this principle is that Commonwealth citizens can 
acquire United Kingdom citizenship after five years' residence. 
According to Mr. Wilson's statement in the Commons on 8 May 1967, 
the British Government considers that, except as otherwise provided 
-in association agreements, for instance-the facilities granted 
Commonwealth immigrants in the United Kingdom after accession 
should not necessarily give them rights to enter the labour markets 
of other countries in the wider Community. On the other hand the 
British Government does recognize that a problem exists regarding 
priority in access to employment. 
(i) Transport 
86. Enlargement should not cause any difficulties beyond those 
already encountered by the Six in building up a common policy for 
road, rail and inland waterway transport. It would, however, 
create a new situation for sea and air transport, in view of the part 
played by these modes of transport not only in trade with non-
member countries but also in the internal trade of the enlarged 
Community. The possibility of Community action in these fields 
is provided for in the Treaty of Rome, and it would be useful if 
during the negotiations this point too could be examined. 
(j) ECSC levy 
87. The ECSC has resources deriving directly or indirectly from 
the levy, part of which is available for such operations as the 
enlarged Community might undertake. 
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The countries which have asked to join the Community should 
therefore contribute proportionately to these resources since they 
would benefit from any such operations by the same token as the 
Six benefit from them at the moment. 
The biggest resources are the guarantee funds (100 million units of 
account) and the special reserve (about 88 million units of account). 
It is from these monies that credits are granted under Articles 54 
and 56 of the ECSC Treaty and that workers' housing and the 
interest-rate rebates for conversion credits are financed. 
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B. Enlarged Community and 
non-member Countries 

CHAPTER V 
88. Enlargement of the Community by the accession of four 
countries including the United Kingdom would have important 
repercussions on relations with non-member countries. The 
enlarged Community would be by far the biggest importer in 
the world, and its responsibilities, both inside and outside Europe, 
would be substantially increased. Moreover, its greater weight 
would be likely to expand considerably its ability to take action 
at international level. 
The most immediate problems concern relations with those member 
countries of EFTA which cannot or do not wish to join the 
Community and also relations with the Commonwealth countries, 
given the special links between them and the United Kingdom 
and the existence of an association with African countries and 
Madagascar. The problem of the Commonwealth cannot be 
isolated from those raised by relations with the other industrialized 
or less developed non-member countries. 
The present chapter, then, after a brief review of the broad 
consequences that enlargement of the Community will have on its 
relations with non-member countries, is devoted to an examination 
of the future relations between an enlarged Community and the 
various classes of less developed countries and also between the 
enlarged Community and those industrialized countries which do 
not form part of Western Europe. 
1. GENERAL EFFECTS OF ENLARGEMENT 
ON RELATIONS WITH NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES 
89. Accession of the four countries seeking membership could turn 
the Community, whose volume of external trade already exceeds that 
of the United States, into the foremost commercial power in the 
world, accounting for 25.6% of all international trade, as against 
17.2% for the Six. Consequently the Community would play a 
vital part in the evolution of international trade. 
s. 9/10. 1969 89 
The Community's chief suppliers would experience a considerable 
increase in their percentage of exports to the Community as a result 
of accession of the new members (see table below). 
However, the consequences to non-member countries must be 
assessed with due regard to the stimulating effect which extension 
of the Community might have on economic expansion in Europe. 
In this connection the experience of the Six shows that the impact 
of the intra-Community preference implicit in the customs union 
may in quite large part be offset by economic expansion. 
90. Nevertheless, urgent appeals are to be expected from non-
members, especially but not exclusively the Commonwealth 
countries: they will be seeking either a further general reduction of 
tariffs or preferential concessions or concessions on certain products. 
91. If account is taken not only of the fact that the tariffs of the 
new member countries and of the United Kingdom in particular are 
generally higher than the CCT, but also of the outcome of the recent 
negotiations in Geneva, the Community should be able to resist all 
demands for a new overall reduction in tariffs, at least until 
completion of its economic union puts it into a better position to 
meet international competition. 
Nevertheless, the requests of the Commonwealth developing 
countries are sure to constitute an urgent problem if the 
Community is enlarged. 
2. RELATIONS 
WITH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(a) General 
92. The Community of the Six already bears heavy responsibilities 
in the field of development aid through its association arrangements 
with a large number of less developed countries, most of them in 
Africa. 
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Countries or areas 
1. United States 
Total 
Present 
Community 
Enlarged 
Community 
2. Canada 
Total 
Present 
Community 
Enlarged 
Community 
3. Japan 
Total 
Present 
Community 
Enlarged 
Community 
4. Australia 
Total 
Present 
Community 
Enlarged 
Community 
5. New Zealand 
Total 
Present 
Community 
Enlarged 
Community 
6. South Africa 
Total 
Present 
Community 
Enlarged 
Community 
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Share of the Community in the external trade 
of a selection of non-member countries 
or areas in 1966 and 1967 
IMPORTS EXPORTS 
1966 1967 1966 1967 
in $m.l in% in $m.l in% in $m.l in% in $m.l in% 
25 550 28 745 29 899 31 147 
4 125 16.9 5 387 18.7 5 264 17.6 5 859 18.8 
6 342 24.8 7 588 26.4 7 318 24.5 8 607 27.6 
9 127 10 966 9 551 10 555 
509 5.6 545 4.9 597 6.3 640 6.1 
1 164 12.7 1 177 10.8 1 768 18.5 2 019 19.1 
9 523 11 664 9 776 10 441 
447 4.7 655 5.6 595 6.1 546 5.2 
700 7.4 974 8.3 991 10.1 1 125 10.7 
3 636 3 913 3 158 3 478 
366 10.1 426 10.9 501 15.9 456 13.1 
1 104 30.4 1 157 29.6 1 134 36.0 986 28.4 
1 095 955 1 076 993 
63 5.8 66 6.9 180 16.7 117 11.8 
424 38.7 347 36.3 714 66.4 639 64.5 
2 526 2 945 1 726 1 931 
503 19.9 611 20.7 413 23.9 410 21.4 
1 206 43.8 1 350 45.8 1 062 61.5 1 117 57.8 
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Share of the Community in the external trade 
of a selection of non-member countries 
or areas in 1966 and 1967 (continued) 
IMPORTS EXPORTS 
Countries or areas 1966 1967 
1966 1967 
in $m.[ in% in $m.[ in% in $m.[ in% in $m.[ in% 
7. Eastern Europe 
Total 20 702 22 132 21 246 23 150 
Present 
Community 3 670 17.7 4 612 20.8 3 848 18.1 4 240 18.3 
Enlarged 
Community 4 882 23.6 5 986 27.1 5 737 27.0 6 192 26.7 
8. Developing 
countries 
Total 39 900 41 700 38 300 39 600 
Present 
Community 8 469 21.2 9 029 21.6 11 642 30.4 11 931 30.1 
Enlarged 
Community 12 450 31.2 12 821 30.7 16 699 43.6 17 101 43.2 
9. Latin America 
Total 9 740 10 290 11 040 11 030 
Present 
Community 2 137 21.9 2 296 22.3 2 902 26.3 2 902 26.3 
Enlarged 
Community 2 997 30.3 3 162 30.7 4 227 38.3 4 285 38.8 
10. Far East 
Total 13 590 14 720 9 760 10 090 
Present 
Community 1 555 11.4 1 567 10.6 1 252 12.8 1 145 11.3 
Enlarged 
Community 2 716 20.0 2 661 18.1 2 338 24.0 2 238 22.2 
11. Middle East 
Total 6 360 6 010 7 770 8 450 
Present 
Community 1 258 20.1 1 298 21.6 2 605 33.5 2 911 34.4 
Enlarged 
Community 2 001 32.0 1 987 33.1 3 687 47.5 4 131 48.9 
Note: The data concerning the areas or groups of countries from 4 (Australia) to 11 (Middle East) 
inclusive have been computed as "derived figures" in respect of the Community share (both 
Six and Ten countries), i.e. Community imports= exports of these areas or groups of countries 
and!_vice versa. 
Sources: OECD, Foreign Trade Statistics Bulletins, Series C, 1967. 
International Financial Statistics, Vol. XXII, No. 6, June 1969. 
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Enlargement would cause the Community to expand its activities in 
the sphere of development aid either within or outside the 
association framework. The wider responsibilities would be due 
not only to the accession of new members with high living standards 
but also to the fact that one of them, the United Kingdom, has in 
the Commonwealth complex and often historic links with a large 
number of less developed countries. 
93. The Commonwealth problems were examined in detail during 
the negotiations that were interrupted in 1963. The Commission 
considers that the arrangements envisaged at that time may retain 
some validity and should be examined case by case. The closer 
links established between the EEC and certain Commonwealth 
countries, the tariff cuts agreed in the Kennedy Round and the 
autonomous suspensions of duty applied by agreement between the 
EEC and the United Kingdom also help to simplify the problem. 
The same applies to the reduction of the common customs tariff 
envisaged for a number of tropical products including raw coffee, 
cocoa and palm oil, in the framework of the new Association 
Convention with the African States and Madagascar (AASM). 
If the Community accorded the developing countries tariff 
preferences for their exports of manufactured and semi-finished 
products, this would help avoid or offset most of the short-term 
inconveniences which enlargement of the Community would entail 
for certain countries inside or outside the Commonwealth. The 
autonomous preferential concessions which the Community would 
make would, of course, have to be reviewed or at least reassessed 
in quantitative terms when new countries join. 
(b) Effects of enlargement on relations with associated 
countries 
(AASM and Commonwealth countries with comparable economic 
structure and comparable production) 
94. The Community's association arrangements concern at the 
present time seventeen African States and Madagascar, all associated 
under the Yaounde Convention, certain Commonwealth countries 
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whose economic structure and production are comparable with those 
of the AASM, and several countries or territories outside Europe 
which are not independent. 
A new member of the Community would be required to maintain 
with the developing countries relations identical with those now 
maintained with them by the Six. Conversely, the associated 
developing countries would have to accord any new member the 
same treatment as they already accord the Six. 
In 1962 it was envisaged that the non-independent Commonwealth 
overseas countries should be associated on the same terms as 
the non-independent associated overseas countries or territories. 
Correspondingly those independent Commonwealth1 countries whose 
structure and production are comparable with those of the AASM 
would qualify for association with the enlarged Community. 
In this connection it should be remembered that alongside the trade 
clauses, financial and technical co-operation are a key element in the 
arrangements for the association of overseas States, countries and 
territories with the EEC. The aid given through the Community 
represents an appreciable part of the total official aid (multilateral 
and bilateral combined) which the Yaounde countries receive from 
the Six. As an enlarged Community could not cease to give some 
measure of Community aid in addition to the bilateral aid provided 
by the Member States, new members would have to make their 
contribution. This aid would be available to all the associates, for 
manifestly it would not be possible, among countries of comparable 
structure and comparable production, that one group should 
benefit from technical and financial assistance while another did 
not. 
Such aid would moreover help to stimulate economic co-ordination 
between associated countries, particularly for those countries that 
have special links with various Member States. 
However, it should be made clear from the outset that arrangements 
on trade and financial and technical assistance could, apart from 
their application to the Yaounde countries, be applied only to those 
1 States in Africa south of the Sahara and in the Caribbean. 
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Commonwealth developing countries which accepted the reciprocal 
rights and obligations entailed in association arrangements with the 
EEC: if any of them were unwilling to accept these terms, they 
could have nothing beyond a trade agreement with the Community. 
The benefits they could enjoy under such agreements could not be 
equivalent to those deriving from association agreements. 
95. A word should be said in conclusion on the way in which wider 
association arrangements might affect the interests of the present 
associates. Efforts would be made to attenuate any ill effects by 
appropriate measures, with due regard to what the Yaounde 
countries and the new overseas associates really do export to the 
enlarged Community, and also to any new arrangements made at 
world level, for example under commodity agreements. 
It is already clear that anything which is a sensitive commodity for 
the economy of some present or future associate will require special 
examination during the negotiations. 
96. It must be borne in mind that the association arrangements 
with the AASM and the three East African States which have just 
been renewed will expire at latest on 31 January 1975; eighteen 
months before the expiry of these Agreements, the Contracting 
Parties are to examine the arrangements that could be adopted for 
a further period. 
(c) Relations with the Maghreb countries 
97. The need to establish homogeneous Community arrangements 
for all products traded with Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria would 
become greater should new countries-particularly the United 
Kingdom-join the Six. 
The difficulties which now beset the Community of the Six-in 
current or planned negotiations-in its efforts to grant preferences 
to agricultural produce from the Mediterranean area would be eased 
if the Community consumer market were widened by the accession of 
Northern European countries. 
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(d) Relations with the other developing countries 
98. Enlargement of the Community, and a larger number of 
associates would also raise problems in connection with the 
other less developed countries for which association cannot be 
contemplated. 
The impact of any extension of the preferences enjoyed by the 
associated countries on the position of the other developing 
countries, especially those in Latin America, on the markets of 
the enlarged Community, will need to be carefully considered. 
The remarks made above concerning the implication of an enlarged 
Community for the Yaounde countries also apply here. 
Nevertheless, the grant of tariff preferences by the enlarged 
Community and other developed countries should prove to be 
an advantage for these countries and help them to accept the 
consequences of wider European integration. 
99. With reference more especially to the Commonwealth countries 
of Asia, the agreement contemplated in 1962 could be re-examined by 
the enlarged Community. It should however be noted that 
these countries have already been granted certain concessions-
autonomous or contractual-by the Community in recent years. 
These concessions have solved a number of the problems which 
had been raised in the 1962 negotiations. The granting by the 
industrialized countries-as planned under the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)-of preferences 
for manufactures and semi-manufactures from all the developing 
countries could also help to solve the latter's problems. 
Imports from Hong Kong pose a special problem. 
100. In any case, the accession of new members should provide a 
new impetus and enable a broader development policy to be drawn 
up. In particular, this policy should be integrated in its technical, 
financial and commercial aspects, should be adjusted from the 
regional point of view and should help to facilitate the creation of 
economic groups. 
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101. In this connection, it would be desirable for the enlarged 
Community to study any possibilities of taking Community action 
for the benefit of the Latin American countries in accordance with 
the guidelines recently drawn up by the Commission. 
3. RELATIONS 
WITH THE OTHER NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES 
1022. The relations between an enlarged Community and the 
developed Commonwealth countries, the United States, Japan, 
the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe are discussed below. 
(a) Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
103. The United Kingdom Government has not stated that special 
arrangements are required for the developed Commonwealth 
countries, with the exception of New Zealand and its milk products. 
This may be explained first of all by the fact that the relative 
importance of exports from these countries to the United Kingdom 
is diminishing, as the table below shows: 
Canada 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Exports from developed Commonwealth countries 
to the United Kingdom 
(as % of exports to aU countries) 
1 1938 1 1953 1 1960 1 1963 1 1967 
37.2 16.2 17.3 13.8 10.3 
54.7 37.9 26.9 17.4 12.7 
83.4 67.1 53.0 48.4 44.8 
Moreover, the elimination of Commonwealth preferences once the 
United Kingdom applies the common customs tariff will be made 
easier by the results of the Kennedy Round. 
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In these circumstances, the removal of Commonwealth preferences 
should not present insurmountable difficulties if it takes place 
progressively over a transitional period and so enables the necessary 
adjustments to be made. 
The long-term solutions to the problems of the main agricultural 
commodities can be found only in a world context. If necessary 
the Community could take further steps to bring to a successful 
conclusion the efforts it was making in the Kennedy Round 
to establish world agreements on trade in certain agricultural 
commodities. 
(b) The United States 
104. Where the United States is concerned, an examination of 
commercial problems alone would not be enough. For the 
Community, whether it has six members or more, the United States 
will be a partner which, because of its size, will be of exceptional 
importance. The accession of several States, and of the United 
Kingdom in particular, would mean that the Community could 
hope, as a result of its increased dimensions, to have one day a 
potential comparable with that of the United States or, at least, 
that the gap between Europe and the United States would not 
grow wider. The Community would then have better chances of 
putting the relations between Europe and America on a footing 
of equality. 
(c) Japan 
105. Assuming enlargement takes place, Japanese exports to the 
Community would-on the basis of the 1968 figures-rise from 
$685 million to $1 264 million (or from 5.3% to 9.7% of Japan's 
total exports); imports from the Community would go up from 
$737 million to $1 036 million (or from 5.7% to 8% of Japan's total 
imports). 
The greater importance of relations with Japan would make it even 
more necessary than before for the old and new members of the 
Community to agree on a common commercial policy towards this 
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country; the Community will, moreover, shortly be called upon to 
examine the possibility of concluding a Community trade agreement 
with it. 
(d) USSR and countries of Eastern Europe 
106. The tendency to establish closer economic links between the 
Community and the countries of Eastern Europe might be 
strengthened by the enlargement of the Community: the enhanced 
importance of the wider Community as a trading partner could 
well induce the USSR and the other Eastern European countries 
to take an objective look at the advantages that would stem from 
contact with the Community. 
Care would nevertheless have to be taken that the development of 
trading relations with these countries did not take place in extended 
order; if each of the old or new Member States tried to obtain 
individual advantages, the consequences could be damaging for 
the Community. For this reason, the elaboration of a common 
commercial policy towards Eastern Europe should not be postponed 
during the period of accession negotiations and should be accepted 
by the new members. It does not, however, seem that enlargement 
is likely to cause additional difficulties in this sphere. 
Harmonization of the Member States' policies towards the 
Eastern European countries was begun a few years ago and the 
lines followed have been much the same as those previously 
adopted by the United Kingdom. 
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